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INTRODUCTION
In the United States as throughout the world, trade policy seems to
be evolving at breakneck speed today, goaded by both internal politics
and an increasingly integrated world economy. Hidden in the controversy
* O'Melveny & Meyers, Washington, D.C. office (1995-96). J.D., Harvard Law School
(1995). A.B., Harvard University (1992). The editors wish to express their condolences to the
family and friends of Mr. Kim, who died when this essay was still in the early stages of the
editing process. The editors are also grateful to Professor William P. Alford for his assistance
in bringing the manuscript into final form.
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and hysteria accompanying this transformation,' the "Rule of Law"
(ROL)2 has been growing, unheralded and unrecognized, within the
international trading system. Recent innovations and developments in the
field of international trade allow nations to negotiate binding laws
governing conduct in trade, which extend to both nations and their sub-
parts. Safeguards are in place to ensure that these laws, when domesti-
cally implemented, are as transparent as possible. Nations have also made
efforts to coordinate the substance of their laws, in an attempt to harmo-
nize the international body of trade law. Most impressively, a "court"
now sits and adjudicates disputes over compliance with these laws, with
the power of economic sanctions behind it.
This study focuses on the emergence of ROL in U.S. international
trade policy, a development which merits closer examination for the fol-
lowing reasons. 3 First, the United States must still be considered the
1. See, e.g., RAVI BATRA, THE POORING OF AMERICA, COMPETITION AND THE MYTH OF
FREE TRADE (1994); Ross PEROT & PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY:
WHY NAFTA MUST BE STOPPED Now! (1993); Joan Claybrook, Fast Track Can Be Hazard-
ous to Your Health, W. POST, May 17, 1991, at A25. See also Keith Bradsher, Battles on
Trade Are Far From Over, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at 45; Paul Blustein, WTO Ruling
Draws Fierce Criticism: Buchanan, Nader Groups Assail Decision Against U.S. on Fuel
Imports, W. POST., Jan. 19, 1996, at F3.
2. Although touted as the great accomplishment of Western Civilization, and bandied
about as the ultimate ideal in law, the term "Rule of Law" has managed to elude a consistent
definition. Fortunately, it has gathered an entourage of core concepts that enable us to discuss
the subject. As a foundation, the laws of a Rule of Law society must be certain, stable,
predictable, and yet amenable to change. While maintaining this delicate balance, they must
also exhibit a general congruence with the community's values (here, the community of
nations). Finally, the laws must be universally applicable by neutral and independent persons
or bodies, and overseen by a control authority capable of requiring compliance and enforcing
sanctions. See e.g., LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 108-18 (2d ed. 1969); FRIEDRICH
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-87 (1944); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43
(1971); JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210-29
(1979); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3
(Robert L. Cunningham ed. 1979); GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDA-
TION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1988); Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law
Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L. REV. 249 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. REV. 781 (1989).
3. Analysis of U.S. trade policy for purposes of this study shall reference numerous
international agreements and institutions to which the United States is a party, namely: the
World Trade Organization (formerly, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), created by
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for
signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947]; the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994];
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1995) [hereinafter
Uruguay Round Implementation Act]; the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,
1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 107 Stat. 2066, 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994)
[hereinafter NARITA]; North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation Act]; the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989)
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leader in international trade policy, and a ROL order without the most
important trading entity would make little sense.4 Second, the United
States is probably the foremost proponent of instituting a ROL order in
international trade,' though, ironically, it may also be the prime culprit in
adhering to certain power-ordered relationships. Third, it seems only fair,
if not natural, to extend the United States' domestic respect for the ROL
to international relations. The exercise of such relations under a rule-
oriented order brings these dealings much closer to the notions of "fair-
ness" and "due process" that govern our domestic affairs. Fourth, the
United States has also expressed interest in helping to foster ROL
systems in foreign countries 7 (although it has not always acted in this
fashion). An international economic ROL system may help familiarize
[hereinafter CUSTFA]; and the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988))
[hereinafter CUSFTA Implementation Act]. Bilateral and unilateral trade issues and policies
will also be discussed, where relevant. The U.S.-Israel FTA will not be covered because of its
relatively small scope. United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M.
653 (1985); United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement Implementation Act of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-47, 99 Stat. 82 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988)).
4. The most obvious example of the need for U.S. support is provided by the collapse of
the International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1947 when the United States withdrew its
sponsorship (more on this later). Following the completion of GATT 1994, however, several
dozen countries ratified the pact without awaiting its result in the United States. Raymond
Vernon, The World Trade Organization: A New Stage In International Trade and Develop-
ment, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 329, 332 (1995). Also worth noting are the recent negotiations
spearheaded by the EU regarding the global opening of financial markets (the first global deal
negotiated under the WTO). See, Dean Foust & Bill Javetski, The World Financial Pact:
Washington Plays Hard to Get, Bus. WK., Aug. 14, 1995, at 51. Even though the United
States pulled out of these talks, the agreement still surged forward and may be successful in
its aims. See, The WTO's Big Hitchhiker, EUR. WALL ST. J., Jul. 31, 1995, at 10; Bhushan
Bahree & Charles Goldsmith, WTO Countries Agree to Relax Curbs on Foreign Banking,
Financial Services, WALL ST. J., Jul. 27, 1995, at A2. Similarly, after the ITO was conceived,
Liberia was the only country to ratify the ITO Charter before seeing if the United States did.
5. See, e.g., U.S.-Sino Relations - Intellectual Property Rights: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on E. Asian and Pac. Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and the
Subcomm. on Asia. and the Pac. and Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Ambassador Michael Kantor); Trade Agenda: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Ambassador Michael Kantor).
6. On the other hand, some may favor the United States' ability within a power-oriented
framework to force changes in other countries' domestic policies regarding human rights,
environmental protection, labor standards, and such. However, the United States has moved
away from using its trade muscle to influence such policies, as indicated by the annual debate
in Washington about the renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status with human rights for
China. See, e.g., Mary McGrory, The Price Is Rights, WASH. POST, May 31, 1994, at A02;
Robert S. Greenberger & Michael K. Frisby, Clinton Renews China's Status for Trading,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 1994, at A3.
7. The Hon. Glenn Robert Lawrence, Are We Exporting Our Legal System?, 41 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 672 (1994); Hearing Before the House Int'l. Rel. Comm., 104th Cong. (1995)
(statement of Penn Kemble, Deputy Director, USIA).
8. See, e.g., Cuban Liberty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114 (1996); see also, infra, AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RULE OF LAW (Report of the International Law Committee of
National Lawyers Guild, 1966).
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those countries with some of the institutions, procedures, and benefits (as
well costs) of the ROL system. Finally, some argue that the development
of U.S. constitutional doctrine profoundly impacts the evolution of other
legal systems abroad. 9 Therefore, the constitutional responses of the
United States may be the most important of any nation's for purposes of
understanding national legal responses to trade liberalization.
The significance of these developments deserves heightened attention
in light of present questions surrounding U.S. economic internation-
alization. As a response, this study aspires to prompt dialogue regarding
the emergence of the ROL in this area so that better informed conclu-
sions can be reached. A central focus of the debate must be the U.S.
Constitution, which has often conflicted with the ROL developments.
Some of these debates reflect the evolution of constitutional interpreta-
tion in the face of increasing international economic integration. Other
battles may have merely been "phantom" conflicts, with special interest
and protectionist groups seizing upon questionable readings of the
Constitution in order to bolster their opposition to certain reforms.'" Of
course, there have been legitimate clashes; however, they have mostly
been resolved in the direction of facilitating the course of international
trade. And thus far, the difficult questions have been skirted. Most
importantly, has the movement toward the ROL proceeded at the expense
of U.S. constitutional integrity? And if so, what does this say about how
well the Constitution is equipped to deal with a global society?
This study begins with an overview of an alternative to the Rule of
Law system - the "power-oriented framework." An examination of that
framework will reveal the extent to which the current trade order has
diverted from it. The brunt of the analysis then covers the major reforms
in U.S. international trade policy. We shall observe a curious dialectic in
which these reforms struggle to achieve a more ROL-based order, and yet
face opposition from their domestic ROL master, the U.S. Constitution.
9. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Beer, The Influence of American Constitutionalism in Asia, in
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD 113, 114 (George Athan Billias ed., 1990) ("United
States constitutionalism remains an important reference point because of America's power, but
also because many Asians accept the inherent transcultural value of a few elements in
America's approach to democratic government and law"); see also, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louis Henkin &
Albert Rosenthal eds., 1990); KLAUS VON BEYME, AMERICA AS A MODEL (1987); ALBERT P.
BLAUSTEIN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD (1986).
10. Regarding one such conflict (the treaty/executive agreement debate, discussed infra),
Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans wrote fifty years ago, "At ... times the theme is, more
bluntly, that there are special minority interests in this country that must be given a delusive
protection however much the interests of the whole nation ... may suffer." Myres S.
McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements.
Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 188 (1945).
(Vol. 17:967
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The purpose of this analysis is not to prove that these reforms are either
constitutional or unconstitutional. Rather, the intent is to inform the
reader of this conflict, and to provide him/her with a matrix in which to
form an informed opinion of the greatest reforms which are yet to come.
A story of the emergence of the ROL in U.S. trade policy must also
include a tale of how the United States came to accept a system of
external "controls" over itself. This story is two-part: first, about the
United States as a sovereign nation vis-a-vis other nations, and second,
about the United States vis-A-vis the states (the federalism issue).
I. THE RULE OF LAW
In order to understand the concept of an international Rule of Law,
one must understand what it is not. As John H. Jackson has discussed,
the primary alternative to a rule-based trading system is a power-oriented
one, where nations with comparatively greater power or economic clout
determine the operational guidelines of trade, and where the lesser
countries must accept it or be left out of the system." Among the major
economic powers, there is a constant pull toward "beggar-thy-neighbor"
policies, because economic superiority is the linchpin of their control.
The goal in a power-oriented system is not to make the pie bigger, but
to receive a comparatively larger share of it. In the process, basic trade
economics shows that the absolute share received by all diminishes.
Although the United States has largely embarked upon a rule-orient-
ed course, aspects of a power-oriented framework still persist in its trade
relations. Negotiations with non-GATT nations are governed to a large
extent by power dynamics - a fact well illustrated by the United States'
recent tangles with China over intellectual property rights12 and its acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 13 And though a primary
aim of the Uruguay Round negotiations was to obtain political commit-
ments decrying the use of unilateral measures to resolve disputes,' 4 the
United States still remains enamored with power tactics in its dealings
with the WTO nations as well. The United States' unilateral weapons are
11. See John H. Jackson, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS 10, 85-88 (1989).
12. See generally, Paul Kullman, Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Agreement
Commits China to Strong Measures to Curb Policy, Bus. AM., Jan./Feb. 1996; Old China, New
China Woes, NEWSWEEK, April 1, 1996.
13. The WTO is the organization that has been created as the umbrella structure under
which the GATT functions are conducted. See WTO Agreement, art. 2.
14. 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2670 (Teren-
ce P. Steward ed., 1993) (hereinafter NEGOTIATING HISTORY).
Summer 1996)
Michigan Journal of International Law
notorious, to say the least. Section 301 and its siblings, 5 although
designed to engender negotiations, 16 give rise to more diatribe than
dialogue, and the processes they initiate often degenerate into useless
displays of brinkmanship designed to create fleeting images of strength
and conviction.
The results obtained through the deployment of such unilateral
measures suggest that the transaction costs may outweigh any extra gains
the United States is able to squeeze out through the exercise of its
power.'7 Power-oriented trade tactics involve a great deal of expensive
and time-consuming flexing and posing. 8 Moreover, the deals worked
out under the '301' statutes are often little more than eleventh-hour com-
promises calculated not so much to address the inherent problems behind
the conflict, but to save face for the national representatives involved.' 9
Furthermore, third countries can take advantage of the concessions the
United States wins, either through most favored nation (MFN) rights or
through voluntary extensions by the country at issue." Thus, as the
United States watches the results of its time, labor, and political capital
benefit nations which stood by the sidelines, the United States cannot say
a word in protest - after all, the MFN philosophy is an integral leg of
the international trade order's constitutional tripod.2' If there are indeed
15. The 1988 amendments to the Trade Act of 1974 created "Super 301," "Special 301,"
and "Telecommunications 301." Super 301 requires indentification of major trade barriers in
priority foreign countries. 19 U.S.C. § 2411-20 (1994). Special 301, codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2242 (1994), addresses intellectual property issues. Telecommunications 301 attempts to open
foreign telecommunications markets. 19 U.S.C. § 3106 (1994).
16. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 515.
17. One studies estimates that the overall financial gains from successful market openings
from unilateral strong-arm tactics like Section 301 are likely to total only about 4-5 billion
dollars. THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN
U.S. TRADE POLICY 68 (1994).
18. See, e.g., David Friedman, A Lack of Respect; Washington Was Not Making Extreme
Demands on the Japanese During the Trade Negotions. But Tokyo Fought the Terms Vocifer-
ously. Is It Time to Re-Think U.S.-Asian Relations?, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at 1; James
Risen and Evelyn Iritani, News Analysis; Both Sides in Dispute Wary of Escalation, L.A.
TIMES, June 28, 1995, at Al.
19. The recent United States-Japan automobile parts dispute provides a prime example.
See, e.g., Jay Mathews, U.S. Business Skeptical About the Deal, WASH. POST, June 20, 1995,
at F01; Terry Atlas, Trade Pact Saves Face All Around, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1995, at 1.
20. See, e.g., Amy Chew, Business beams on IPR breakthrough, S. CHINA MORN. POST,
Mar. 17, 1995, at 7 (noting that the intellectual property rights agreements deliberately covered
only U.S. entities); but see, Julie Wolf, EU to Press China to Open Markets, GUARDIAN, April
14, 1995, at 11 (reporting that the EC had received assurances from Beijing that the recent
agreement between China and the United States on intellectual property rights would be
extended to European companies); see also, EU Copyrights Covered, S. CHINA MORN. POST,
Apr. 20, 1995, at Business 5.
21. The others are national treatment and the binding of tariffs. See, JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 194 (1969) ("The substantive obligations of GATT
[Vol. 17:967
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areas where the United States can benefit from power-oriented tactics
instead of multilateral approaches, then these areas would be those where
the United States remains the primary international manufacturer and
supplier of a product. Of course, very few such areas remain.22
It is not hard to conclude that the movement towards the ROL is the
right direction for the United States and that a return to a power-oriented
system would not be beneficial. Even if this were not so, it is also
uncertain how much longer the United States can rely on its economic
strength to win such concessions. Although the United States is clearly
the strongest of the trading nations,23 the gap is narrowing and will
continue to narrow. With the growing presence of the developing and
newly industrialized countries and the booming domestic markets within
those nations, 24 it will be beneficial for the United States in the long run
to wean itself and its trading partners off the power-oriented framework
now.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF RULE OF LAW IN U.S. TRADE POLICY
A. The Rule of Law Holding Court
A legalistic culture is the heart of a Rule of Law society. Because of
their important role in the establishment of the ROL, dispute resolution
mechanisms may be the most important subject of the present analysis.
As in the other areas of reform, U.S. support for the international
dispute resolution system is essential to its survival and vitality. Thus,
the question on everyone's mind is whether the United States will defer
to the international trade system (and the WTO) or whether it will insist
on operating above the law.25 The answer depends on whether the United
can be grouped into three types: (1) tariff commitments; (2) Most-Favored-Nation treatment;
and (3) a series of commitments regarding other nontariff trade barriers."); id. at 277 (defining
national treament provisions of the GATT as the means to meet the third GATT obligation of
regulating nontariff barriers).
22. Examples of sectors in which the United States remains the primary international
manufacturer and supplier of a product are in the markets of: cereals, 48.6%, firearms and
ammunition, 62.1%, and aircraft, 43.5%. 1994 INT'L TRADE STAT. Y.B. 19, 203, 236, U.N.
Sales No. E/F.96.XVII.2, vol. II.
23. Total Imports and Exports by Regions and Countries and Areas, id. at S2-S 15.
24. The Department of Commerce estimates that over 75% of the expected growth in
world trade over the next two decades will come from the developing and newly industrialized
countries (NICS). See The Big Emerging Markets, Bus. AM., Mar. 1994, at 4. In addition, it
predicts that by 2010, the "big emerging markets" (BEMs) will be importing more than the EU
and Japan combined. See Betting on the BEMs; big emerging markets, Information Access Co.,
Dec. 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
25. See generally, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements and Estab-
lishment of the World Trade Organization, Hearing Before the House Ways and Means Trade
Summer 1996]
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States is willing to relinquish some of its judicial and quasi-judicial
authority to international bodies.2 This represents a dangerous incursion
into the United States' (and many of its trading partners') established
notions of sovereignty. Indeed, the pragmatists fear that a binding dispute
resolution system may lead to recalcitrance on the part of the major
trading powers, thus de-legitimizing the entire system.27
Because private parties will not be directly involved in the WTO's
dispute resolution system, the judicial and quasi-judicial authority that
must be relinquished is not as "concrete" as the authority that would
have been involved if private parties were involved. Conversely, private
parties lie at the heart of the North American Free Trade Agreement (and
previously, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement) resolutions of
antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) disputes, as well as
investment cases. 2' Thus, in those agreements, the relinquishment of
judicial authority was one of the most sensitive issues.
1. Supranational Dispute Resolution
Ambivalence over the appropriate role of the dispute resolution
system creates an environment conducive to a power-oriented framework.
Under such conditions, enforcement of internationally adjudicated deci-
sions requires resorting to the jurisdictional powers of the prevailing
States. Such a "settlement of disputes [would be] dependent upon the
status of the parties." 29
The pre-WTO GATT system was not far removed from the above
description. Any party could block the formation of the dispute resolu-
tion panel itself, or alternatively, prevent the adoption of the panel report,
thus nullifying the effect of the whole proceeding.30 Even without a
Subcomm., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Amb. Michael Kantor) available in 1996 WL
117230.
26. One can only hope that the United States' undignified withdrawal from the World
Court during the U.S.-Nicaragua dispute is not a precursor to the United States' treatment of
the WTO. Letter from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State of the United States of America,
to Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Oct. 7, 1985) (terminating
the United States' acceptance of compulstory jurisdiction), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742.
27. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLU-
TION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 364 (1993).
28. See discussion infra notes 36-52.
29. Peter Behrens, Alternative Methods of Dispute Settlement in International Economic
Relations, in ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 1, 11 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Gonther Jaenicke eds., 1992).
30. When the GATT first began, the contracting parties adopted panel reports by majority
vote, pursuant to Article XXV:4. However, practice among the contracting parties has been to
adopt reports by consensus. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GAT LAW AND PRACTICE
(6th ed. 1994).
[Vol. 17:967
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blockage of the panel report, little existed in the way of remedies.
Retaliation was theoretically possible, but it required consensus approval
of the contracting parties.31 The parties viewed retaliation as a last resort,
agreeing that dispute resolution in GATT should not be coercive but
voluntary and diplomatic based on "the normative force of organized
community condemnation. '32 Needless to say, this system hardly intruded
upon traditional judicial functions,33 and no major constitutional issues
arose in this context. What aspects of legalism the mechanism did exhibit
during the panel proceedings were usually swept over by the wave of
power-oriented negotiations that always followed them.34
a. A Survey of the CUSFTA and NAFTA
The United States' first major relinquishment of judicial authority in
the field of international trade came in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUSFTA). Canada and the United States established a bind-
ing binational panel review system to resolve disputes concerning final
.AD and CVD orders from the administering bodies of either country.35
31. JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
342-43 (3rd ed. 1995).
32. Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round. An Unfinished
Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 150 (1980).
33. Commentators have observed: "GAIT is ... a long way from being a court, or at
least from being accepted as one. Accordingly, a totally juristic approach to solving all of the
problems governments take to GAIT would likely be unworkable." David Palmeter & Gregory
J. Spak, Resolving Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Disputes: Defining GATT's Role in
an Era of Increasing Conflict, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1145, 1151 (1993). Evidence,
however, suggests that the system may have warranted some credit. According to Hudec, of
the 139 complaints that he found to have been valid, conceded as valid, and settled or
withdrawn despite their probable validity, the complaining party received full satisfaction in
60% of the cases and partial satisfaction in another 29%. HUDEC, supra note 27, at 285.
34. A general dissatisfaction with GATT's dispute settlement mechanism provided one of
the incentives for the launching of the Uruguay Round. Robert E. Hudec, Strengthening of.
Procedures for Settling Disputes, in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 425-26 (1995). Interestingly, one of the most exciting aspects of GATT's history
in dispute settlement is a chapter that never happened - the aborted launching of the ITO.
Many of the concerns and objectives for the Uruguay Round's Dispute Settlement Under-
standing were first expressed in conjunction with the ITO. The "Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization" included provisions for refraining from unilateral measures
to resolve trade disputes, appellate review, and even a cross-institutional provision whereby the
International Court of Justice would issue binding advisory opinions. Havana Charter for an
International Trade in Final Act and Related Documents, United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment, Held in Havana, Cuba, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1947), arts. 92-96. With the
demise of the ITO, these ideas lay dormant for almost forty years, only truly awakening with
the onset of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
35. CUSFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904. The agreement also provides for general dispute
resolution administered under the Canada-U.S. Trade Commission. Id. at arts. 1801(1), 1806.
Unlike the AD and CVD review panels, the findings of the Commission are merely declarato-
ry, and not binding. The Canadians demanded this panel review system to encourage U.S.
administrative authorities to follow more of a rule-oriented approach. JACKSON, supra note 31,
at 596-98.
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These international panels were authorized to sit as reviewing bodies for
domestic judicial and administrative decisions. The agreement boldly
declared that each Party "shall replace" its judicial review of final AD
and CVD determinations with binational panel reviews. 36 In another first
development of its kind in the United States, the CUSFTA gave private
parties the right to these reviews.37 The agreement also provided for
higher review of the panel decisions, although only in limited situations.
Under the "extraordinary challenge procedure," each Party 38 could chal-
lenge the decision of a binational panel on the ground that: (i) a member
(or members) of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, conflict
of interest, etc.; (ii) the panel departed from a fundamental rule of proce-
dure; (iii) the panel exceeded its authority or jurisdiction as defined by
article 1904; or (iv) the existence of one or more of the above factors
"materially affected" the panel's decision.39
In addition, the CUSFTA established a Bilateral Trade Commission
to oversee CUSFTA implementation and to resolve certain interpretative
disputes.' Parties could request consultations on any actual or proposed
measure which could affect the Agreement.4' If consultations failed,
either Party could require the Commission to form a panel.42 Most
importantly, the complaining Party had the authority to retaliate if the
violating Party did not come into compliance with the panel's report.43
The dispute resolution system proved successful. Both countries
vigorously asserted their rights within it, and the panels responded with
decisions of uniformly high quality.44 Correspondingly, the parties in
both government-to-government disputes and AD and CVD duty matters
fully respected and implemented the panel decisions.45
36. CUSFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904:1. NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1904(i) also repeats
this language.
37. CUSFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(5).
38. Only the national parties to the agreement could bring an appeal to the Extraordinary
Challenge Committees, not the participants in the litigation itself.
39. CUSFrA, supra note 3, art. 1904(13), annex 1904.13.
40. CUSFTA, supra note 3, art. 1802.
41. Id. art. 1807.
42. Id.
43. Id. art. 1807(9).
44. Jonathan T. Fried, Two Paradigms for the Rule of International Trade Law, 20 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. 39, 51 (1994), citing Andreas Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement Under
Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal, 24
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 269 (1991).
45. Id.
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The essential elements of CUSFTA's Chapter 19 dispute resolution
process for AD and CVD issues were adopted in the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).46 Meanwhile, NAFTA Chapter 20 ex-
tends the inter-Party dispute resolution system to such nontraditional
areas as intellectual property rights, standards (sanitary and phytosanitary,
environmental, and health), and services.47 It covers "all disputes between
the Parties regarding the interpretation or application" of NAFTA and
instances where "a Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of
another Party is or would be inconsistent with the obligations of [this]
Agreement or cause nullification or impairment" of the Agreement.
48
Beyond these bread-and-butter dispute resolution provisions, NAFTA
also contains some particularly interesting innovations. First, it institutes
a new process designed to safeguard the panel review system. Chapter 19
provides for a three-member Special Committee which may be invoked
if another Party's domestic law:
46. The NAFrA system replaces the CUSFrA system for the United States and Canada.
Here is a list of some of the particulars of the NAF'A system:
*The panelists are drawn from an agreed-upon roster developed by the signatories.
NAFrA, supra note 3, annex 1901(2). See also NAFrA: Rules of Procedure for
Binational Panel Reviews, art. 1904 Panel Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 8686 (1994). The
roster was include sitting or retired judges to the fullest extent possible, unlike the
CUSFTA panels, where most of them had been lawyers familiar with or practicing
international trade law. NAFTA, supra note 3, Ch. 19, annex 1901.2 at 19-16 to 19-
18. Unfortunately, no judges have, as yet, volunteered to sit on the panels.
*The NAFTA panels apply the same standards of review and general legal princi-
ples as the domestic system of the country in which the AD or CVD case originat-
ed. NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1904, at 19-3.
*NAFIA also tightens the ethical provisions for panel members. It requires panel
members to be "of good character, high standing and repute" to be objective,
reliable, and of sound judgment and to have a general familiarity with international
trade law. NAFI'A, supra note 3, annex 1901.2. In a recent conversation with a
NAFIA panelist, the author was assured that the Parties (at least the United States)
were serious in applying these safeguards.
*CUSFrA's extraordinary challenge procedure has also been transferred to NAFTA.
Id. art. 1904. See also Extraordinary Challenge Committee Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 8702
(1994). NAFTA elaborates the grounds on which a complaint to the Extraordinary
Challenge Committee (ECC) can be brought - if "the panel manifestly exceeded
its powers, authority or jurisdiction set forth in this Article, for example by failing
to apply the appropriate standard of review." Id. art. 1904(13)(a)(iii). The ECC has
90 days under NAFTA, instead of 30 days under the CUSFA, to issue a decision.
Id annex 1904(13)(2).
47. This chapter has been praised as "another step forward in the ongoing evolution of
legal means for resolving trade disputes." Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute
Resolution Under the NAFTA: The Newer and Improved Model, 27 INT'L LAW. 603 (1993).
48. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 2004, at 20-3.
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(i) has prevented the establishment of a panel,
(ii) prevents a panel from rendering a final decision, or results in
failure to provide for judicial or panel review, or
(iii) has prevented the implementation of a panel decision.49
If the Special Committee makes an affirmative finding, the Parties will
either negotiate a solution or the complaining Party may suspend the
operation of the relevant chapter, subject in turn to retaliatory suspension
by the offending Party. The existence of this novel (and comically
circular) procedure evinces an intent to prevent domestic legislative
deficiencies from intentionally or non-intentionally impeding the proper
functioning of the panel system.
An obscure provision in NAFTA regarding the arbitration of invest-
ment disputes has the potential of becoming the most important, and
contentious, element of the agreement. Chapter 1 1B provides for arbi-
tration of investment disputes, including those of private investors.50 In
and of itself, that raises no eyebrows - U.S. Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation Treaties and Bilateral Investment Treaties have done the same
for years. What is amazing is the broad definition of "investment" and
"investor," 5' which, taken with the extension of MFN and national
treatment obligations to all measures relating to the "establishment,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition
of investments, 52 opens the range of possible disputes subject to arbitra-
tion far beyond traditional investment disputes and expropriation issues.
b. The World Trade Organization
The success of the CUSFTA dispute resolution system (and the
weakness of the old GATT model) prompted the United States to de-
mand such a system for the GATT community. At the time of the
launching of the Uruguay Round, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR), Clayton Yeutter, announced that the GATT itself would collapse
49. Id. art. 1905. The Special Committee is to be made up of three members which are
to be selected from the same fifteen person roster as that used for the ECC, and comprised of
judges or former judges of a federal judicial court of the United States, Canada, or Mexico. Id.
art. 1905, at 19-8.
50. NAFTA, supra note 3, Chapter I lB.
51. NAFTA defines "investment" as including "an enterprise," while an "investor" is a
national of a Party "that seeks to make, is making or has made an investment .... Id art.
1139.
52. Id arts. 1102, 1003 (emphasis provided).
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unless its dispute settlement mechanisms were strengthened.53 This was
not an unexpected stance, given the fact that the United States was then
the plaintiff in most of the cases in which it was involved. 4 However,
the period following the commencement of the Uruguay Round Negotia-
tions from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, saw an interesting turn-
around - the United States became increasingly targeted as a defendant.
Not surprisingly, U.S. support for the binding nature of the dispute
resolution system diminished." Once the United States "got the ball
rolling" in the Uruguay Round, however, it found the momentum irre-
versible, and many other parties jumped onboard in the hope that the
United States would rely on the new dispute resolution system instead of
on its notorious unilateral measures. 6 The result of these efforts was the
WTO - the crowning achievement of the Uruguay Round."
When a dispute arises under the WTO system, and consultations do
not produce a resolution within the standard sixty days, the complaining
party may request a WTO panel. Operating under the new "integrated
system," these panels will be able to address any dispute arising under
GATT 1994 or its subsidiary agreements (unless another formal mecha-
nism for resolution of that particular issue is otherwise provided for).
They are to be comprised of three individuals with prior experience in
international trade law and GATT (unless the parties request five).5 8 The
53. Felix Dearden, Yeutter: GATT Headed for Oblivion Unless ... , J. COM., Sept. 12,
1986, at 2A.
54. Palmeter & Spak, supra note 33, at 1148.
55. The stance of Congress also shifted from wanting swift and effective enforcement to
opposing such enforcement, and Congress began to realize that, in Senator Bentsen's words,
"the catch is this: If we want tough rules and a fast and effective dispute settlement system
when we are plaintiffs in a case, we also have to live with the same rules when we are the
defendants." Palmeter & Spak, supra note 33, at 1148-49, (citing 138 CONG. REC. SIll0,
S 111 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1992) (comments of Senator Bentsen on the Uruguay Round)).
56. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 343.
57. U.S. acceptance of the WTO and what it stands for indicates an incredible psycho-
logical evolution. Just a few years ago, one commentator, responding to a call for a GATT
"supercourt" (somewhat like the WTO Dispute Settlement Body), stated that such a court was
unfeasible given (i) the political processes involved and (ii) the potential incompatibility of
such an institution with embedded ideas of representative government. Phillip R. Trimble,
International Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1020 (1985). He felt that
it was inconceivable that a President or the Congress would go along with such a proposal and
concluded: "Even the active involvement of the United States in world affairs, and the
dramatically increased national interdependence of the international economy, will alter this
attitude only slowly, if at all." Id at 1026. Alas, attitudes and practices may be progressing
faster than many had anticipated.
58. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, art. 8(3), WTO Agreement, annex 2, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1226 (hereinafter DSU].
None of these panelists will be citizens of Members whose governments are parties (or third
parties) to the dispute, unless the parties to the dispute consent. Id. art. 8(5).
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panel reports will be automatically adopted, unless the Dipute Settlement
Body (DSB) decides by consensus not to adopt the report (note that this
is the exact opposite of the previous GATT system), or one of the parties
formally announces its intention to appeal. 9
Appeals of the panel reports are taken to the "Standing Appellate
Body" (SAB), a standing body of seven persons,60 which oversees the
dispute resolution process. Characteristics of common law systems have
strongly influenced the WTO's appellate review system.6' Appeals will
be limited to issues of law found in the panel reports. Although the
decisions rendered in GATT dispute settlement procedures bind only the
involved parties, there is a certain level of de facto stare decisis, as
panels do rely heavily on past precedents.62
These panel and appellate proceedings under the WTO now progress
along a concrete time table.63 This represents a major improvement in the
legalization of the GATT. Under the old system, stories abounded about
the parties' use of delays to stall the formal dispute resolution processes
until they became meaningless. The classic example is the United States'
DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporation) export tax incentive
dispute with the EC, in which the United States delayed resolution of the
case for over a decade.'
59. Id. art. 16.4.
60. Seven individuals with demonstrated expertise in law will be appointed by the Dispute
Settlement Board to serve for four-year terms. DSU, supra note 58, art. 17. They will serve in
rotation, with three presiding over any given case, and the renewal terms will be staggered to
assure some degree of continuity in the SAB. Members of the SAB are required to be
completely independent and broadly representative of membership in the GATT.
61. In a move to inject more of a judicial character to the panels, Article 15 requires that
they submit their legal analysis for comment. Article 18(1) of the DSU also provides that there
are to be no ex parte communications between the panel or appellate body and the parties
regarding a case in dispute.
62. John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement Techniques Between Nations Concerning Economic
Relations: With Special Emphasis on GATT, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 39, 52 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1984); JACKSON, supra note
11, at 90 (1989) (stating that the diplomats and officials who participate in the GATI system are
very influenced by "precedent," and that they often mention them in detail in GATT delibera-
tions, and concluding that a common-law lawyer would find him or herself very much at home
in the GATT legal proceeding); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, Strengthening the GATT Dispute
Settlement System: On the Use of Arbitration in GAiT, in 5 THE NEW GATT ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 323, 335 (Emst-Ulrich
Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988) (noting that even though GATT panels and GATI
contracting parties are theoretically permitted to deviate from GATT interpretations applied in
previously adopted panel reports, they have hardly ever done so).
63. DSU, supra note 58, app. 3 at para. 12, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1246.
64. The GATT proceeding began in 1973. The panel's report was not issued until 1976,
and then the United States prevented adoption of the report until 1981. Even upon accepting
the report, the United States took almost three years to enact legislation changing the DISC tax
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The changes outlined above drastically alter the conditions under
which the GATT parties will negotiate to resolve disputes. First, the
mandatory consultations now occur under the "shadow of a panel,"
whereas before, they were conducted under the shadow of panel veto.65
While several of the Tokyo Round Agreements had recognized the right
to a panel, the Uruguay Round for the first time explicitly establishes it
under the integrated Article XXIII dispute settlement system.66 The new
provisions shift the burden, and instead of a consensus needed to estab-
lish a panel, a consensus is now needed not to establish one. This takes
away the respondent's advantage under the previous system, in which the
respondent could threaten to block the panel request, and thus influence
the framing of the issues that eventually appeared before the panel.
Negotiations now also take place under the shadow of adoption of
the report, as opposed to under the shadow of blockage. One might
surmise that this should not make much difference, since very few panel
reports have not been adopted.67 However, panel reports were designed
to win acceptance by the Parties, and the panels searched for acceptable
compromises, while the Parties themselves negotiated over what types of
results would be suitable for adoption. 68 Now the panels can afford to be
much less political in their determinations.
2. Constitutional Growing Pains
From the conceptually amorphous GATT panels to the binding
mechanisms of the WTO, efforts to encourage legalism have met with
constitutional resistance in the United States. Each time, the ROL choice
has prevailed, frankly, because practical considerations have outweighed
the constitutional concerns. (This is different from saying that the choice
to pursue ROL was an unconstitutional one - especially when the
constitutional interpretation requires a balancing of such practical
incentive. See, e.g., ERWIN P. EICHMANN, PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF GATT DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: MOVING TOWARD LEGALISM 5 (1990); Robert E. Hudec, Legal Issues in US-EC
Trade Policy: GATT Litigation 1960-1985, in ISSUES IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS 17 (R.
Baldwin et al. eds., 1988).
65. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2461-64 (1991)
(discussing the phenomena of the "shadow of the vote" versus the "shadow of the veto" in the
EU).
66. See EICHMANN, supra note 64, at 61-62; DSU, supra note 58, art. 6(1), reprinted in
33 I.L.M. 1230.
67. As of 1987, only five panel reports under Article XXIII:2 dispute settlement have not
been adopted. EICHMANN, supra note 64, at 46.
68. See, e.g., id. at 54.
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considerations.) The case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. aptly demonstrates the prevailing judicial attitude in this
area (even though the case involved international arbitration, not adjudi-
cation).6 a Justice Blackmun noted:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly
be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts.... We cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms,
governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.70
On the other hand, two noted internationalists implore that "[i]mportant
as GATT dispute settlement may be, the United States certainly should
not tamper with its constitutional structure to further it.
'71
Some would argue that this is precisely what happened in the
CUSFTA. Indeed, the constitutionality of CUSFTA's binational panels
was challenged in court, but the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion.72 Well before that suit, however, observers were familiar with the
constitutional issues raised by CUSFTA. At the time of its implementa-
tion, the chair of the House Judiciary subcommittee posed three issues
for consideration:
(i) whether the bill violated Article III of the Constitution by failing
to authorize judicial review;
(ii) whether the bill violated the Appointments Clause; and
(iii) whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment re-
quired that some form of judicial review be available to claimants
in these AD and CVD cases.73
In response to these concerns, Congress provided in the implementing
legislation that if the binational panel review system were found uncon-
69. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
70. Id. at 629 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972)).
71. Palmeter & Spak, supra note 33, at 1164.
72. Nat'l Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. U.S., 827 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1993). Two
U.S. associations filed suit arguing the unconstitutionality of Chapter 19 of the CUSFTA. Nat'l
Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. U.S., No. 92-1898 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 9, 1992) (assigned
to Judge Royce Lamberth). However, instead of filing in the D.C. Circuit, as was required by
the Implementing Act (19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(g)(4)(A)), the plaintiffs filed instead with the
District Court for the District of Columbia, thus prompting dismissal. 827 F. Supp. at 796-97.
73. U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Adrmin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). Should any of these questions be answered in
the affirmative, the implementing legislation contains special procedures that kick in. However,
it is highly unlikely that these provisions will ever be applied.
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stitutional, the President would have the authority to accept the decisions
of the binational panels and the Extraordinary Challenge Committees on
behalf of the United States.74 President Reagan completed this "safety
valve" by issuing Executive Order 12662, which stated that in the event
of such a determination of unconstitutionality, he would accept in whole
all the decisions of the binational panels.7" These efforts represented an
unprecedented cooperation between Congress and the President to shield
an international agreement from constitutional challenge.
Many observers were understandably disturbed by this cooperative
effort, claiming that neither the executive nor Congress had the authority
to negotiate and agree to these binational panels. The customs bar was
especially opposed to the binational panels taking over judicial review
from the Court of International Trade (not in small part due to the
perceived threat of loss of business). 76 They argued that AD and CVD
duties were traditionally reviewed by Article III courts, and that the
binational panel mechanism was therefore an unconstitutional creation.77
a. The Article III Challenge to CUSFTA
7
1
To address the Article III controversy, Congress wrote an expedited
judicial review process into the CUSFTA Implementation Act for pure
constitutional questions stemming from the AD and CVD proceedings.79
The scope of review was limited to "facial constitutional challenges," and
review of the binational panel decisions as such was barred.' Observers
wondered whether this provided adequate appellate review for the
binational panel mechanism. Some thought not, since there was no
Article III review of the panels' legal and factual determinations.8 1 The
Supreme Court, however, has not required an extensive system of review.
74. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(g)(7)(B) (1994). Moreover, no court would have the power or
jurisdiction to review such action. Id.
75. 3 C.F.R. 624 (1989).
76. See Gordon A. Christensen & Kimberly Gambrel, Constitutionality of Binational
Panel Review in Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L LAW. 401, 414-15 (1989).
77. Id. at 414. See also Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141 (1994) (arguing the
NAFTA's AD and CVD panels violate Article III, but advocating the amendment of Article
III to allow for such transnational panels).
78. Much of the following discussion is taken from Christensen & Gambrel, supra note
76.
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(g)(4)(B) (1994).
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(g)(4)(G) (1994).
81. See, Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative
Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U.L. REv. 85, 139 (1988). '
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Under Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. 2 and Dames
& Moore v. Regan,8 3 the panels were probably proper, given the avail-
ability of review for constitutional challenges.
The panels also satisfied the alternative approach to assessing Article
III validity that was laid out by the Court in CFTC v. Schor.84 One factor
in this test is an examination of the extent to which the tribunal en-
croaches upon traditional judicial functions and jurisdictions. 5 Given that
Article III courts have traditionally reviewed AD and CVD cases, the
CUSFTA (and now NAFTA) panels would probably fail this part of the
test. 6
The panels would fare better under the second factor, which asks
whether "public rights" or "private rights" are involved. 7 "Public rights"
are those created by the government," while "private rights" involve the
liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.89 Schor
allows "public rights" issues to be settled in non-Article III forums,
explaining that questions of public rights, more easily than questions of
private rights, can be relegated to administrative adjudication without
encroaching on the powers of the judiciary. 9° The current understanding
of trade rights (especially antidumping and countervailing duties) is that
they involve "public rights," since they are benefits conferred by Con-
gress (which Congress can also take away). 9'
82. 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1984) (noting that because review of constitutional error was
preserved by a statute installing an arbitration system, Article III was not violated).
83. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). Even though the Court found no explicit statutory authorization
for the President's suspension of judicial proceedings pending against Iran and its state
enterprises, it did hold that Congress had implicitly authorized the formation of the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal via both emergency legislation and Congress' long-standing acquiescence to
the settlement of claims against foreign governments and nations via executive agreement. Id.
at 678-82. The Court also concluded that the adjudication by the international tribunal did not
totally divest U.S. courts of jurisdiction - constitutional claims for the taking of property, if
left unsatisfied by the tribunal, could be resurrected in U.S. courts. Id. at 684-85; see
Christensen & Gambrel, supra note 76, at 415-16.
84. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
85. Id. at 851-52.
86. Due to the relatively short history of international trade adjudication, it is not clear
whether it can be seen as "traditional."
87. I at 853-54.
88. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70 (1982).
89. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
90. 478 U.S. at 853-54.
91. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929) (holding that trade suits are public
rights); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (sug-
gesting that international trade cases are often "public rights" controversies); see also H.R.
REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 7 (1988) (noting that antidumping and counter-
vailing duties are a benefit bestowed on U.S. businesses by Congress, and therefore Congress
can properly limit judicial review of such benefits); Christensen & Gambrel, supra note 76, at
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The panels arguably satisfy the third consideration, which evaluates
the pragmatic concerns motivating congressional departure from Article
III courts.' Congress has justified its prior departures from Article III on
either of two grounds: reducing the backlog in Article III courts or
creating Article I courts in highly specialized areas to develop expertise.
However, nothing precludes the consideration of additional types of
pragmatic concerns - such as congressional interest in having the
CUSFTA finalized, in assessing the propriety of removing review from
Article III courts. After all, Canada was not about to accept the Agree-
ment without the binational panel review system.93
b. The Appointments Clause Challenge
Another criticism of the CUSFTA and NAFTA panel system was
that it conferred the authority to interpret and administer laws of the
United States upon persons not appointed in conformity with the Ap-
pointments Clause.94 Under Buckley v. Valeo, all persons "exercising
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States" need to be
appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause. 95 Critics contend-
ed that none of the panel members (whether Canadian or American)
would be officers under Article II, and yet they would be applying and
administering the laws of the United States.96 Professor William Davey,
418 ("[tlhe correction of market distortions for the broader purpose of greater wealth and
economic integration and the adjustments necessary to avoid unfair competition are public
problems ill-suited for traditional adjudication.")
92. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. One may note that the inclusion of pragmatic concerns as part
of this analysis indicates that Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline Construction Co.,
in which he argued that "Article III is not to be read out of the Constitution ... [but rather
that] it should be read as expressing one value that must be balanced against competing
constitutional values and legislative responsibilities" eventually won out. Northern Pipeline,
458 U.S. 50 at 113.
93. Michael Wilson, Canada's Minister of International Trade, in a speech in Ottawa on
July 23, 1992, stated that the eleventh-hour U.S. agreement to the binational panel review of
anitdumping and countervailing duty determinations saved CUSFTA, as cited in Michael H.
Greenberg, Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the North American
Free Trade Agreement: Implications for the Court of International Trade, 25 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 37, n.7 (1993).
94. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2.
95. 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Some have
suggested that U.S. panelists qualify as "inferior officers" under the Appointments Clause. This
is probably not true, given the authority of the binational panel members. Note also that in
WTO panel cases in which the United States is a party, none of the panel members will be the
U.S. appointees, unless expressly agreed upon by the parties.
96. See Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution
Provisions of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1299 (1992). See also Nat'l Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. U.S., 827 F. Supp 794 (D.D.C.
1993).
Summer 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
however, has argued that the Appointments Clause is not implicated
because the binational panels exercise their authority pursuant to the
CUSFTA, and not the laws of the United States.97 Moreover, when
panels review U.S. cases, they arguably do not even apply U.S. law per
se, since the CUSFTA explicitly incorporates U.S. AD and CVD laws for
purposes of the review.98 The best argument, though, may be that the
panelists are actually "inferior officers" under the holding of Morrison v.
Olson.99 All four prongs of the Morrison test dictate this result: (i) the
USTR has complete discretion on an annual basis to appoint, reappoint,
or refuse to reappoint the U.S. panelists; (ii) the panelists perform limited
duties; (iii) their jurisdiction is limited; and (iv) the positions are only
temporary appointments (as the rosters are valid for one year).0
c. Due Process Argument
Along with the Article III and Appointments Clause challenges, the
petitioners in National Council for Industrial Defense included a due
process argument.'0 ' The issue here was whether the additional proce-
dural protection which would be offered by judicial review (beyond
constitutional review) is necessary to protect the litigant. Under the
balancing test established by Mathews v. Eldridge," the answer here is
most likely no.
First, as established in the Article III analysis, the level of judicial
review necessary is minimal, since AD and CVD duties involve public
rights. Second, as in the Schor analysis, nothing precludes the consider-
ation of the United States' interest in completing CUSFTA negotiations
as part of the government interest prong of the Mathews analysis.
Finally, being denied access to review of a trade conflict in a federal
court is not, by itself, a denial of due process: it must be shown that the
binational panels are incapable of affording due process in reviewing the
97. William J. Davey, The Appointments Clause and International Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms: A False Conflict 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315, 1316-17 (1992). "It is the
[CUS]FTA, and not U.S. law, that provides when and how panels are to be established, what
their functions are, what standard of review they are to apply, the time limits within which
they are to complete their tasks and so on." Id.
98. Id. at 1318.
99. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
100. See Davey, supra note 97, at 1320-21.
101. See Nat'l Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v. U.S., 827 F Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1993).
102. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews test requires consideration of three factors: (1)
the private interest that will be affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and probable
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including
the fiscal and administrative burdens. Id.
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final orders. 3 The safeguards that were built into the CUSFTA un-
doubtedly would have precluded such a finding. The binational panels
were required to (i) confine their reviews of the final orders of the
Department of Commerce or International Trade Commission to the ad-
ministrative record' 4 and (ii) adhere to the standard of review set forth
in the CUSFTA as well as to the general legal principles applicable to
the U.S. Court of International Trade.105 If either government felt that a
binational panel strayed beyond these bounds, it had the right to invoke
the extraordinary challenge procedures discussed earlier.' °6 And if neither
government initiated an extraordinary challenge procedure when clear
evidence of abuse was furnished by a private party, a constitutional claim
could have been made before a federal court.
3. Remaining Problems: "Wrong Cases,"
Little Cases, and Private Parties
Some important concerns have been shifted to the periphery in the
rush towards legalization in the world trading system. For example,
Hudec has drawn attention to a possible set of cases in which the appli-
cation of the GATT dispute resolution mechanism could be detrimental
to the overall system. These "wrong" cases occur when parties demand
the implementation of inoperative or outdated rules whose legal criteria
are unrealistic or politically impossible, or when a panel is called upon
to issue a ruling outside its decision-making capacity.' 0 7 Jackson also
notes that there may be situations where the GATT should be violated or
where no case should be brought. 0 8 If a complaint were to be carried
through to completion under such circumstances, the result might be that
one party would openly flaunt compliance, or the panel would deliber-
ately misapply the relevant rule. Either way, the legitimacy of the system
would be called into question.
Although academics' criticisms have addressed the issue of "wrong
cases" in the WTO dispute resolution system, the more serious short-
comings of the system have not yet been adequately aired. The chief
problem with the WTO system is that it is a mechanism designed for
full-blown adversarial conflicts, but the vast majority of the conflicts are
not really adversarial; rather, they are interpretive disputes, involving
103. Id.
104. CUSFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(2).
105. Id art. 1904(3); CUSFTA Implementation Act, supra note 3, § 401a(b)(1)(A) and (B).
106. CUSFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(13).
107. See Hudec, supra note 27, at 159-66.
108. JACKSON, supra note 62, at 85.
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nuances in application.'1 9 Therefore, what is really needed is a process
whereby a WTO panel or the SAB can issue binding interpretations. "0
As it stands right now, only the WTO general body can make binding
interpretations of the WTO/GATT agreements"' - a clumsy political
compromise capable of being vastly improved. The CUSFTA Article 18
panels provide an excellent model to start with, in that they were autho-
rized to issue binding interpretations of the Agreement."' Thus, interpre-
tive disputes could be resolved without recourse to full-blown and
adversarial litigation, and with corresponding benefits for transparency."
t 3
The fact that private parties do not have direct access to the WTO
system is another cause for concern. If corporations have a complaint
regarding the practices of a member nation, they must go to their nation-
al authorities, and their national authorities must espouse their cause at
the WTO level. The resources of the national government involved
determine whether these complaints can be adequately settled. Thus,
although everyone is theoretically equal under the law, in practice they
are not. Companies of small countries will find their complaints buried
for years while their harried authorities attempt to deal with the backlog.
Meanwhile, the world powers, with their huge resources, will be able to
accommodate many more complaints. Unfortunately, the privatization of
dispute resolution under the WTO is years away." 4 In the psychology of
international agreements, few nations are comfortable giving private
parties access to ultimate decisionmaking levels."
5
109. For example, the biggest trade friction problems arise over nuances of competition
policy, which is not clearly delineated in the WTO. Such activities include "cartel-like
activities; non-competitive business practices; informal arrangements between governments and
companies; closed distribution systems; all of the so-called nontariff barriers that have been so
much in dispute over the past ten or fifteen years." Clyde Prestowitz, Comment to John H.
Jackson, The World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, and Codes of Conduct 78, 79-80
in THE NEw GATT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (Susan M. Collins and Barry P.
Bosworth, eds., 1994).
110. Of course, the scope of this process would be strictly limited to interpretation. Any-
thing that would change or amend treaty text would be left for WTO General Body to address
through the amendments process.
111. WTO Agreement, art. IX, sec. 2.
112. CUSFTA, supra note 3, art. 1802.
113. See, e.g., United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Article 1904 Binational Panel,
In the Matter of Article 304 and the Definition of Direct Cost of Processing or Direct Cost of
Assembling, USA-92-1807-01, available in Westlaw, database NAFrA-BIP, doc. 1992 WL
174413 (U.S.-Can. F.T.A. Binational Panel, June 8, 1992). Canada brought the case, reportedly
at the request of General Motors and Toyota, who were planning a joint venture in Canda for
production of vehicles for export to the United States. Bialos & Siegel, supra note 47, at 611
n.38.
114. The NAFTA Chapter 1lB arbitration mechanism, see infra notes 50-52, will be
watched closely. If successful, it may provide a model for a privatized trade dispute resolution
on a global scale.
115. For example, NAFTA's antidumping and countervailing duties panel appeals system
does not allow private party access, and the governments must bring the cases for them. But
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B. Certainty, Predictability, & Relative Stability:
The Quest For Transparency
The requirements of certainty, predictability, and relative stability of
laws represent key elements of the Rule of Law. Freidrich A. von Hayek,
the noted political theorist, has seized upon them as the foundation to the
ROL.116 Hayek summarized his idea of transparency as the requirement
".... that government in all its actions [be] bound by rules fixed and
announced beforehand - rules which make it possible to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances."' 17 And long before the writings of Hayek, Max Weber
noted that legal certainty is necessary for capitalist progress."1
8
The major trade agreements to which the United States has been a
party - GATT, NAFTA, and CUSFTA - represent serious efforts to
improve the transparency of trade laws and regulations that govern the
United States and its trading partners. GATT 1994 makes no less than 41
references to "transparency," and these are more specific than the refer-
ences found in the Tokyo Round. Several of the other Uruguay Round
agreements even contain their own articles on transparency, tailored to
the subject matter of the agreement.'' 9 Other provisions follow up their
calls for transparency with concrete obligations. 20
interestingly, the governments have included provisions to the effect that they will automati-
cally espouse any appeal the private parties wish to bring. Relatedly, NAFTA's integrated
dispute resolution system for the whole agreement can be accessed only by the governmental
Parties. The United States, however, has committed to "automatic triggering" - whenever a
private party brings a timely request to U.S. authorities, and the party could otherwise have
challenged the determination in court, the United States will automatically trigger panel review.
Panel Review Under Article 1904 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 59 Fed.Reg.
228 (1994). One notes that it would have been just as easy to allow private party access in the
first place, had it not been for the psychological discomfort. (Note: the exception in this area
may lie in the field of international human rights, although private parties must still jump
through all the hoops of their national legal system. Cf. European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
116. See GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 22 (1988).
117. Francis J. Mootz, III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration That the Obvious
Is Plausible, 61 TENN. L. REV. 69, 71 (1993), citing FREIDPICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM 54 (1944).
118. Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983), citing 2 MAX
WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 883 (G. Roth & R. Wittich eds., 1968).
119. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures
includes its own article (and annex) on the transparency of such provisions, as does the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. See WTO Agreement, annex IA.
120. For example, the provisions on preshipment inspections (PSIs) require that the
importing nation provide exporters a list of all the information necessary to pass the PSI, and
that the inspections (which are usually done by hired private inspection companies) be
conducted in a transparent manner. Although this requirement may seem absurdly basic, PSI
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Where the international system depends upon domestic implementa-
tion for effect, the transparency of domestic legal systems becomes just
as important as the transparency of the international system itself. For
this reason, GATT 1994 includes a call for increased domestic transpar-
ency as part of its understanding on the operation of the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (TPRM).' It states:
Members recognize the inherent value of domestic transparency of
government decision-making on trade policy matters for both
Members' economies and the multilateral trading system, and agree
to encourage and promote greater transparency within their own
systems, acknowledging that the implementation of domestic trans-
parency must be on a voluntary basis and take account of each
Member's legal and political systems.
122
While this provision is only precatory, it reflects the philosophy of
domestic transparency that runs through the whole agreement.
NAFTA and GATT 1994 borrow from U.S. domestic schemes
designed to enhance transparency, including a set of provisions that
resembles domestic administrative rulemaking procedures. If a NAFTA
Party wishes to modify or adopt a measure which would affect trade
among the three nations, it must give public notice at least 60 days prior
to the effective date.' Comments of the other Parties are to be consid-
ered, with answers provided to all "reasonable" inquiries.'24 GATT 1994
contains similar provisions. 25 Both agreements also require the creation
measures have long been utilized, usually by developing countries, as a non-transparent barrier
for foreign exporters. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, WTO Agreement, annex IA.
121. The TPRM is the GAT'T system's "surveillance" mechanism. It monitors the trade
laws and practices of the contracting parties on a periodic basis, and publishes its findings to
the various countries' levels of compliance.
122. Trade Policy Review Mechanism, April 15, 1994, at Part B, WTO Agreement, annex
IA.
123. NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1803 (notification) (requiring Parties to notify one another
in advance of any statutory changes to significant trade laws). See also, id., art. 718:1
(requiring notification of any modification or changes to domestic SPS measures); id., art.
1902(2)(a)(ii) (predicating permitted changes in the AD or CVD laws of each Party on proper
notification of other Parties and proper consultations with them).
124. These answers are to be supported by relevant documents concerning, among other
things, the Party's risk assessment procedures. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1802(2)(b) (requiring
Parties to allow interested persons and Parties a reasonable opportunity to comment on any
laws, regulation, procedures, and administrative rulings of general application respecting any
matter covered by NAFTA); see also, id., art. 718(l)(d) (allowing other Parties and interested
persons to make comments, and on request, discuss the comments and take them into account).
These provisions seem to have had their origin, at least for the United States, in CUSFTA art.
1803.
125. SPS Agreement, April 15, 1994, at annex B(5)(d), WTO Agreement, annex IA (an
identical provision to the NAFTA art. 718(l)(d) discussed above) SPS Agreement art. 7 and
annex B (requiring notification of SPS measure changes and allowance of a reasonable interval
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of "inquiry points" from which members can receive replies to their
questions concerning relevant measures.126
Additionally, exporters to the NAFTA countries can receive binding
"rule of origin" determinations from the respective customs agencies. The
agreement contains a provision for "advance rulings," a system not
unlike that of declaratory judgments, in which exporters or producers
may request and receive preliminary and binding rulings on whether their
products satisfy NAFTA's rules of origin tests.127 Because rules of origin
largely determine commercial importing and sourcing decisions, this
procedure will contribute greatly to improved transparency.
A minor NAFTA provision on government procurement may warrant
special attention as a possible glimpse into the next "generation" of ROL
development. It requires the Parties to disclose information on the
training of personnel involved in their procuring process."' This may be
the first example of requiring transparency in the inner workings of the
administrative process, not just the laws or regulations.
In signing GATT 1994, the United States made an additional com-
mitment to increased transparency with respect to "gray area measures,"
in which one state negotiates with another state (or one of its industries)
to "voluntarily" limit the quantity of its exports. 129 These measures have
been used, most notably by the United States and European Union, 30 to
bypass previous GATT provisions regarding safeguard measures, thereby
replacing a system of transparent rules and procedures with one that
operates in closed negotiating rooms. 131 Safeguard measures allow a
between the publication of an SPS regulation and its entry into force in order to allow
exporters to comply).
126. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 719; SPS Agreement, supra note 125, at annex B(3).
127. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 509.
128. NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1020.
129. These "voluntary" export restraints (VERs) include Orderly Marketing Agreements
(OMAs) in which governments reach formal agreements regarding the volume of exports, and
voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs), which are basically OMAs that call for industry
participation. Also included are Voluntary Import Expansion agreements (VIEs) and voluntary
undertakings (used to settle antidumping actions).
130. One study estimated that of the 137 export-restraint agreements in place between
1986 and 1987, 68 protected the European Community market, while 45 protected the U.S.
market. Ernesto M. Hizon, The Safeguard Measure/VER Dilemma: The Jekyll and Hyde of
Trade Protection, 15 J. INT'L. L. Bus. 105, 113 (1994).
131. In the years between the late seventies and the end of 1993, only 55 safeguard
actions under Article XIX were reported to the GATT Secretariat, and the rate of use has been
dropping. Hizon, supra note 130, at 109. Gray area measures have also become a prevalent
conclusion to antidumping cases, which are extremely easy to bring. Ostensibly to be used
against foreign producers importing to the United States at "unfair" (below-market value or
below-cost) prices, antidumping regulations are so virulent that they penalize fairly priced
imports as well. Low evidentiary burdens of proof combine with tremendously biased
regulations (in favor of petitioners) to create a tempting weapon against foreign competitors.
And between 1980 and 1988, 348 of the 774 antidumping cases initiated were settled by
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contracting party to impose a moratorium on fairly traded imports when
a domestic industry can show that such imports are causing it serious
injury.'32 However, compensation must be paid for imposing the restric-
tion. 133 One lure of gray area measures is that they allow users to skirt
this requirement.
Article 11 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards now forbids
"voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements, or any other
similar measures on the export or the import side."' 34 Although the
United States and the European Union may still insist upon taking re-
course to such measures, 35 a third country which believes that its right
to market access under GATT is being violated as a result of such a
measure will be able to bring the issue to a WTO panel.
136
C. A Nonstatic Legal System: The Congress, The President
and Trade Negotiations
- "Change at every level of biological and social experience
mocks man's quest for stability: il n'est plus provisoire que le
permanent." - W. Michael Reisman & Eisuke Suzuki.'37
While maintaining transparency and stability, parties to the interna-
tional trading order must also be able to negotiate and ratify changes to
the laws governing their relations in order to adapt to dynamic
negotiated export restraints. J. Michael Finger & Tracy Murray, Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Enforcement in the United States, in ANTIDUMPING: How IT WORKS AND WHO
GETS HURT 241, 246 (J. Michael Finger ed.,1993). Correspondingly, one study estimates that
in the mid-1980s, VERs covered no less than ten percent of world trade and about twelve
percent of non-fuel trade. Hizon, supra note 130, at 112, citing Michael Kostecki, Export
Restraint Agreements and Trade Liberalization, 10 WORLD ECONOMY 425, 428-29 (1987).
132. Agreement on Safeguards, April 15, 1994, at sec. A.1, WTO Agreement, annex IA,
(explaining rules for implementing safeguards under articles 2 through 7 of GATT 1994
Article XIX).
133. See id.
134. Id. at art. 11, para. 1(b). The provision allows each user of a gray area measure, with
the consent of the members concerned, to grandfather one specific measure until December 31,
1999. Id. at para. 2.
G-135. In fact, one observer states that "It will take a sea-change in the mindset of the
GATT member states to guarantee that the VER problem will finally be resolved under the
new 1994 regime." Hizon, supra note 130, at 138.
136. In reality, this will not happen. Therefore, a call for a WTO "attorney general"
makes a lot of sense in this context. See Mavroidis, infra note 241, for a general discussion on
a WTO attorney general.
137. W. Michael Reisman & Eisuke Suzuki, Recognition and Social Change In Interna-
tional Law: A Prologue For Decisionmaking, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 493 (Myres S. McDougal and W.
Michael Reisman, eds. 1981).
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conditions. They must be able to accept liberalization measures when
ready to open borders, or change certain rules when experience has
shown them to be suspect.' This requirement of a flexible legal order
represents the counterpart to the legal stability requirement; it acknowl-
edges that a static system which is unreflective of the changing problems
and conditions in the community does not represent a proper ROL order.
Olivier Long, former director-general of GATT, once declared: "The
rules and procedures of the GATT are such that they can evolve and be
modified in response to changes in the economic and political conditions
that influence trade relations."' 39 However, it was precisely GATT's
inability to evolve that led to a major departure from the dispute resolu-
tion system during the 1960s. 14 In that period, the Contracting Parties
began to sense that the rules were outdated and no longer applicable to
the evolving world of trade.14' For example, they failed to address an
important new source of conflict - non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and
voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs). 142 More recently, because of the
difficulties in amending GATT, 143 the parties turned to other measures,
such as the MTN "side codes" negotiated during the Tokyo Round,
which included deviations from core GATT principles.'"
The theoretical issue of whether international economic laws can be
changed does not present a problem. The short answer is that they can be
changed. The real problem lies in the practical effort to effect this change
- the negotiation process. In order for this process to successfully
address the changing needs and concerns, at least three basic require-
ments must be met. First, the parties (the trading nations) need to know
with whom to negotiate. Second, they need to trust that the results of
138. Of course, in most stable systems, the basic guiding principles such as fairness and
due process, and here, free trade, do not change within the life of the legal system.
139. OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE
SYSTEM 107 (1985).
140. While 40 complaints were filed between 1952 and 1958, Hudec, supra note 27, at
151 n.10, only ten panels were established between 1960 and 1969. Id. at 151-52, cited in
NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 14, at 2679.
141. Hudec, supra note 27, at 152.
142. NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 14, at 2680.
143. The Uruguay Round has succeeded in making the amendments process a bit more
sensible. Now, acceptance by two-thirds of the overall membership will bring many
amendments into force. WTO Agreement, art. X, sec. 3. If the amendment does not affect
member rights and obligations, it will come into force for all members at that time. Id. sec. 4.
Where substantive rights and obligations are accepted, the amendment will come into force
only for those members accepting it, unless a three-quarters vote of the overall WTO mem-
bership decides that if a member does not accept the amendment, it shall be free to withdraw
or remain a member with the permission of the Ministerial Council. Id. sec. 3-4. Amendments
to certain rules take effect only upon acceptance by all members. Id. sec. 2.
144. See JACKSON, supra note 62, at 303.
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their negotiation will not be discarded. Therefore, the representatives of
each of the parties must be competent to make and accept concessions.
Third, the parties need to know that the negotiating countries will not
renege on their obligations through conflicting implementing legislation
or lax enforcement. In the United States, these questions boil down to
two issues: first, whether the President or Congress controls trade negoti-
ations, and second, whether a "fast track" congressional-executive agree-
ment is sufficient to affirm the results.
GATT's amenability to change is deeply affected by the struggle
between the U.S. Congress and the Executive Branch for control over
trade negotiations. This struggle determines both the United States'
participation in the process and its ability to ratify the results into law.
Not surprisingly, the question of whether the United States is able to
meet the three requirements set forth above is heavily dependent on the
constitutional allocation of the powers relating to international trade
negotiations.145 Given the complex and time-consuming nature of multi-
lateral negotiations today, parties need to feel that the United States can
commit to the results of those negotiations before agreeing to participate
in them. No one can afford a reprise of the Kennedy Round, in which
the negotiated agreements never came into effect because Congress
refused to enact the implementing legislation. Thus, Professor Jackson
does not overstate the matter when he declares that "[t]he relationship of
the executive branch (the President) and the Congress is the single most
important factor of U.S. participation in international economic negotia-
tions." t46
Practically speaking, the Executive Branch must have a preeminent
role in the conduct of international trade affairs in order to cultivate a
ROL order which is adaptable to evolving circumstances. 147 Congress is
simply not capable of presenting a united front to negotiate and
145. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 113. See also, Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM,
DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIlS (1990); THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY: CONGRESSIONAL
RESTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE POWER (Thomas M. Franck ed., 1981); THOMAS M. FRANK &
EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS (1979).
146. John H. Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing
International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267. 387 (1982).
147. Stated Justice Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright, "It is quite apparent that if, in the
maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment - perhaps serious embarrassment
- is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be
made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord
to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not
be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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implement changes on a regular basis. 48 Its members are beholden to
parochial constituents and may have difficulty formulating and maintain-
ing positions that are in the nation's best interest.
1 49
Some argue that these "impediments" are the best reasons for giving
Congress more control over trade negotiations. 15 Professor Trimble
mused that if trade agreements were formed the hard way, with heavy
congressional involvement, this would lend more credibility to the
obligations. 151 He posited that the difficulties accompanying congressional
involvement in negotiations, the political pressures applied by special
interests, and the ensuing delays were natural "and even laudable"
features of the U.S. political system.1
2
Nevertheless, the president has come to play a relatively dominant
role in the conduct of international trade affairs.'53 Control is exercised
via an ingenious mechanism known as "fast track,"'"M in which Congress
delegates advance negotiating and accepting authority to the President,
with an understanding that it will quickly approve or disapprove the
resulting agreement without amendment. In return, Congress prescribes
both the general and specific negotiating objectives, as well as monitor-
ing and guiding the negotiations from behind.'55
148. Likewise, if full treaties with supermajority Senate approval are required to bind the
United States, then the political nature of the Senate ensures that we will fail to ratify many of
the changes agreed upon via the multilateral negotiations. (Discussed infra). Other nations
understand this: even after the formal launching of the Tokyo Round, substantive negotiations
did not commence until the U.S. Congress had vested negotiating authority in the President.
NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 14, at 2684-85.
149. Thus, one senator stated in response to the Smoot-Hawley fiasco:
[Olur experience in writing tariff legislation . . . has been discouraging. Trading
between groups and sections is inevitable. Logrolling is inevitable, and in its most
pernicious form. We do not write a national tariff law. We jam together, through
various unholy alliances and combinations, a potpourri or hodgepodge of section
and local tariff rates, which often add to our troubles and increase world misery.
78 Cong.Rec. 10379 (1934) (statement of Sen. Capper).
150. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 57.
151. Id. at 1031.
152. Id. at 1029.
153. For an excellent account of how the struggle has played out between the U.S.
Congress and the Executive, see Harold H. Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade
Policymaking After LN.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191 (1986).
154. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 102, 151; 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2112, 2191.
155. For example, the 1974 Act contained six legislative vetoes (which were tightened in
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979) along with the familiar sunset provision. Although the
legislative veto provisions were eventually held to be unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983), Professor Koh concludes that Congress was deprived of only one of its many
statutory checks on executive discretion. Koh, supra note 153, at 1210. He states that "... far
from crippling Congress, Chadha has inspired Congress to seize more, rather than less,
effective control," making the post-Chadha trade policymaking regime the most congres-
sionally influenced since the days of Smoot-Hawley." Id. at 1211.
Summer 19961
Michigan Journal of International Law
Fast track was born of the understanding that the U.S. treaty process
is too cumbersome for effective international negotiations. For large and
important agreements such as CUSFTA, NAFTA, and GATT 1994,
however, some critics have proclaimed fast track executive agreements to
be unconstitutional. 156 Thus, the resolution of this issue plays a large role
in determining the amenability to change of the international trade order.
Fast track is a type of executive agreement 57 known as a congres-
sional-executive agreement. The "strongest" form of the executive
agreement, it is considered by many to be equivalent to a treaty. 158 On
the other hand, the Constitution lists three types of international agree-
ments: "treaties," "executive agreements," and "compacts.' 59 Professor
Laurence Tribe has argued that these represent discrete categories of
agreements subject to distinct constitutional requirements. 1'" Even the
State Department noted in 1955 that treaties and executive agreements
were not always interchangeable.
161
The Supreme Court has given little guidance in the matter. In B.
Altman & Co. v. United States, the Court spoke of agreements "possess-
ing the dignity of one requiring ratification by the Senate."' 62 There, the
Court found a trade agreement between France and the United States to
be a "treaty" even though it was "not technically a treaty requiring
ratification."'' 63 Twenty-five years later, the Court extended the language
of this case to an executive agreement made with the Soviet Union and
held that it had the status equivalent to that of a treaty, thus superseding
156. GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S.2467 Before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 290 (1994) (Statement by
Lawrence Tribe, Professor, Harvard University Law School); Raoul Berger, The Presidential
Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1972) (asserting: "On the histori-
cal facts, the question, in the words of Professor Philip Kurland, is, 'Should the Constitution
really be read to mean that by calling an agreement an executive agreement rather than a
treaty, the obligation to secure Senate approval is dissolved?' ").
157. For the seminal judicial exposition of presidential powers vis-t-vis Congress, see
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1953) (Justice Jackson's famous
concurring opinion delineating these powers).
158. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 799 (1995); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, supra note 3; but see Raoul Berger,
The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33-37 (1972). The
Restatement states, "[t]he prevailing view is that the Congressional-executive agreement can
be used as an alternative to treaty method in every instance." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303, cmt. e (1987).
159. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3.
160. Statement of Laurence H. Tribe, supra note 156.
161. State Department Circular No. 175, reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1956).
162. B. Altman & Co. v. U.S., 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912).
163. L
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contrary state law.' 64 The Court has recently shifted a bit, declaring that
the word "treaty" under the Constitution has a far more restrictive
meaning than under international law.
165
Scholars have been more energetic in coalescing treaties and execu-
tive agreements.'6 As far back as 1945, Myres S. McDougal and Asher
Lans posited that
our constitutional law today makes available two parallel and
completely interchangeable procedures, wholly applicable to the
same subject matters and of identical domestic and international
legal consequences, for the consummation of international agree-
ments.
167
Today's defenders of the congressional-executive agreement/treaty
interchangeability are led by Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, who
worry that severing this identity would seriously disturb U.S. interna-
tional standing, as many of the United States' key commitments, from
Bretton Woods to the WTO, have taken the form of congressional-
executive agreements. 68
Detlev Vagts has recently entered the fray, supporting many of
Ackerman and Golove's contentions. He maintains that the traditional
position of the House as holder of the pursestrings may require its input
in the ratification of trade agreements. 169 Furthermore, it is practically
impossible to make trade agreements self-executing. Both facts necessi-
tate the House of Representative's involvement on the implementing
legislation. However, "[n]othing is gained by routing an agreement once
over a two-thirds Senate hurdle and then again through both Houses for
a vote on implementing legislation. Nothing, that is, unless one wants to
make approval of the agreement as difficult as possible because one
disapproves of it as a matter of substance."
' 170
164. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
165. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 (1982).
166. See, Ackerman & Golove, supra note 158; see also, McDougal & Lans, supra note
158. See generally, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL CIRCULAR No. 175 (2d
ed. 1985) (establishing guidelines in choosing between executive agreements and treaties).
167. Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, supra note 10, at 187.
168. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 158, at 925.
169. Detlev Vagts, Editorial Comments, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 40, 41 (1995). Ackerman and
Golove had made a similar contention: "Article I, section 7 of the Constitution requires that all
revenue bills originate in the House. Given the impact of these agreements on tariffs (and
therefore revenues), the Senate seems on particularly strong constitutional ground in involving
the House." Ackerman & Golove, supra note 158, at 923.
170. Vagts, supra note 175, at 41.
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Constitutional issues aside, Professor Vagts also reminds us that the
United States' prestige and good name are also on the line. The fast track
arrangement is, in effect, a self-denying ordinance which can be repealed
at any time by regular means. Until it is repealed, it represents a commit-
ment to deal with trade negotiations and agreements in a certain way.
Reasserting the Senate's "prerogative" during the ratification process for
the Uruguay Round Agreements would have represented a severe breach
of faith as to the United States' trading partners (not to mention the
Executive Branch and the House of Representatives), who premised their
involvment in the Uruguay Round talks largely on U.S. fast track author-
ity.
17 1
The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, too, has moved toward recognizing some identity between
the treaty and the executive agreement. 72 Initially, the Restatement
clearly distinguished between treaties and executive agreements for
purposes of their scope and their effect on domestic law. 173 It noted that
a sole executive agreement "does not supersede inconsistent provisions
of earlier acts of Congress" - while a treaty would. 174 This provision
has now been replaced by the statement that "[s]ole executive agreements
with the President's constitutional authority are the law of the United
States and supreme over State law" but that "[t]heir status in relation to
earlier congressional legislation has not been authoritatively deter-
mined."'' 75 One observer concludes that this change may represent a
"calculated move" toward increased status for executive agreements,
mostly brought about by the recognition that executive agreements are
now the most common form (by far) of U.S. international agreements.
176
In the end, the history and continued practice of employing executive
agreements may validate the process in the eyes of the Supreme Court.
In the famous case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, the
Court noted that "a systemic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued
to the knowledge of the Congress [here, mandated by Congress] and
never before questioned ... may be treated as a gloss on 'executive
171. id. at 42.
172. Much of the ensuing discussion is taken from Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 479 (1990).
173. For example, see the titles of §§ 118-21 and 141-44.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 144(a), (b) (1965).
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303,
cmt. j (1987).
176. Brand, supra note 172, at 496.
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power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II."' 77 The Uruguay Round
can now be added to the catalogue of past uses of executive agreements.
D. Harmonization and the Perceived Loss of Sovereignty
The Rule of Law presupposes a coherent, and to a certain degree,
unitarian legal system. The model breaks down when a set of competing
legal systems can potentially govern a single act or relationship. That, in
essence, describes the current trading order. The trade laws of one nation,
especially regarding technical and safety regulations, can differ so much
from those of another so as to effectively preclude trade in certain areas.
Although this problem has long been recognized within the European
Union, the United States and its trading partners have just recently
gathered themselves up for the titantic task of attempting some form of
harmonization. This is no small matter constitutionally, as the current
efforts require parties to hand over a measure of legislative sovereignty.
Determinations traditionally made by domestic legislatures must now be
augmented with internationally determined standards and guidelines, as
well as adjudication.
Without these efforts, however, trade could not flow smoothly.
"Safety" and "quality" standards such as minimum fruit contents for jam,
the size of knotholes in plywood, and the banning of growth hormones
in beef have for years stood as infuriating obstacles to trade. Today,
NAFTA, the new Ururguay Round Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, and the new standards code (Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement) all call for an examination of health
and product standards under legal tests such as "disguised restriction[s]
on international trade" and "unnecessary obstacles to international
trade." 178 They require that the standards be based on scientific principles
and, where possible, international standards.
79
177. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 610-11.
178. SPS Agreement, supra note 125, at art. 2(3); Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (hereinafter Standards Code), WTO Agreement, annex IA, at art. 2(2); NAFTA, supra
note 3, arts. 712(5)-712(6). The CUSFTA also devotes some effort to preventing the use of
product standards as disguised restrictions (Chapter 6). Article 708 deals with standards for
agricultural products, foods, beverages, and certain related goods, and provides that the Parties
shall prevent introducing standards in these areas that constitute an arbitrary, unjustifiable or
disguised restriction on trade.
179. NAFTA, supra note 3, at arts. 712(3) (stating: "Each Party shall ensure that any
sanitary or phytosanitary measure that it adopts, maintains or applies is: (a) based on scientific
principles ... (b) not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence..."); SPS Agreement,
supra note 119, art. 2(2); Standards Code, supra note 178, at art. 2(4) (requiring that Members
may only deviate from international standards when such standards would be ineffective given
the Member's particular "legitimate objective pursued, for instance because of fundamental
climatic or geographical factors of fundamental technological problems").
Summer 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Because of fears of "downward harmonization," NAFTA stipulates
that any harmonization resulting from the use of these international
standards will be upward.8 The Uruguay Round agreements, however,
contain no such provision. This has engendered significant controversy,
with partisans enraged that U.S. health and consumer protection legisla-
tion could be found "illegal" by an international panel. One critic cites
the "Delaney Clause" of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, which
prohibits the sales of products containing any traces of carcinogenics
regardless of how insignificant or harmless the amount, as a possible
target.'8' Consumer advocates and critics decry the fact that this type of
regulation is ripe for repeal by the international community.1
8 2
Some support exists for the fear that state and federal regulations are
ripe for challenge. Both NAFTA and GATT 1994 require parties to
ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive than they need
to be,'83 with the latter stating that there may be a violation if the same
results can be achieved through an alternate route that is "less restrictive
to trade."'8 4 The SPS Agreement can also conceivably be read to require
an incremental cost-benefit balancing test.185 Likewise, recent GATT jur-
isprudence indicates that disproportionately burdensome effects are a
violation of GATT.1
8 6
Most likely, however, GATT 1994 will allow the United States to
adopt much more stringent measures than suggested by the hysteria. The
SPS agreement stipulates that any harmonization of SPS measures should
180. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 713(1). Some wonder whether that in itself was a plastic
commitment. For example, one editorial claims that NAFTA exposes the United States' food
supply to over thirty pesticides currently banned in the United States, but legal in Mexico.
Chip Drury, Senate should treat GATT like a treaty, not like a law, WASH. TIMES 1994 WL
5514505 (Nov. 24, 1994).
181. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1988). Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade
and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1401, 1411 n.27 (1994), citing, Daniel A. Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights,
Environmental Law, and Statutory Interpretation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 676, 697-98 (1994)
(book review).
182. Farber & Hudec, supra note 181, at 1410.
183. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 712(5) (Article 712(6) covers "disguised restrictions," but
the standard of good faith in not using technical standards as disguised trade barriers seems to
cover that requirement); GATT 1994, supra note 3, SPS Agreement, at art. 5(6); id. Standards
Code, at art. 2(2).
184. The SPS Agreement's standard is "significantly less restrictive to trade," SPS
Agreement, supra note 125, at art. 5(6), n.3 (emphasis provided), while the Standards Code
stipulates that technical regulations shall not be maintained where the objectives can be
addressed in a "less trade-restrictive manner." Standards Code, supra note 178, at art. 2(3).
185. Article 6 contains the language, "only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health," which commentators read as possibly mandating such a test.
See, DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 222
(1994).
186. Farber & Hudec, supra note 181, at 1404-07.
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occur "without requiring Members to change their appropriate level of
protection of human, animal or plant life or health. .. ""'7 Furthermore,
it provides a spacious backdoor which permits a Member to deviate from
international standards if the Member determines them to be insufficient
to "achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protec-
tion.""'
E. The Law's Equal Applicability To All:
Sovereignty Revisited
The soul of the Rule of Law is the notion that it is equally applicable
to everyone - rich or poor, powerful or weak. What legitimacy the
international trade system currently enjoys would soon crumble if some
nations (like the United States) were exempt, legally or de facto, from
the full reach of the laws. This would be especially disastrous for the
international economic legal regime, where so much of the pressure to
comply is normative. Thus, this section explores the evolution of the
U.S. views toward sovereignty, which, notwithstanding the current debate
inside the Beltway, concede a remarkable level of authority to the
international system. Without this support from the United States, one
could not truly say that the trade laws of the international system were
equally applicable to everyone. As mentioned above, it remains a reality
that the participation of the United States is required to add legitimacy
and force to the international system, and thus the United States' views
of sovereignty are of vital importance.
1. "Government as Player" versus "Government as Regulator"
In two unrelated contexts - sovereign immunity and government
procurement - U.S. courts have developed a finer understanding of the
roles of sovereigns in commercial and market relationships. The identities
of governments have been split in two for legal purposes: the "gov-
ernment as a player" and the "government as a regulator." This distinc-
tion recognizes that while certain areas remain the domain of national
governments as sovereign entities, other areas require that these govern-
ments participate as "players," with each of them subject to the rules that
bind the rest of the group.
The player/regulator doctrine in foreign affairs was first developed in
the context of sovereign immunity. Beginning with the Tate Letter in
1952, the U.S. State Department espoused the position that governments
187. SPS Agreement, supra note 119.
188. Id. art. 3(3), n.2.
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had become so involved in international trade and commerce that their
sovereign immunity worked some major injustices on private players.'89
This realization led to the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act (FSIA) 9 after which the courts, especially the Supreme Court,
diligently proceeded to develop the surrounding doctrines. In one impor-
tant case, the Court stated in dicta that subjecting foreign governments to
the rule of law in their commercial dealings presented a much smaller
risk of affronting their sovereignty than attempting to review their
governmental acts.' 9' Later, it held that "... when a foreign government
acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player
within it, the foreign sovereign's actions are 'commercial' within the
meaning of the FSIA."' 92 From there, it was but a short step to realize
that if a foreign sovereign's commercial actions are subject to U.S.
domestic laws, then certain U.S. actions should surely be subject to
international trade laws.
The courts transposed the player/regulator distinction into the area of
government procurement, where state and local governments both set the
rules of play and enter into the game.'93 In South-Central Timber Devel-
opment Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Supreme Court held that if a state acts as
a market participant rather than a market regulator in its procurement
activities, the state may not impose conditions that have a substantial
regulatory effect outside the particular market."9
Although the Court addressed a U.S. state statute in that case, the
concepts it applied can readily be extended to sovereign states making
governmental procurement decisions on the international level. The
lesson to be derived from these doctrines is that when a certain area of
trade can be conceptualized as a single market with a single set of
regulations (now especially with the SPS and TBT Agreements), the
national (and state) governments become "players," not "regulators." The
laws should, therefore, be equally applicable to all.
189. Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign
Governments, 26 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
190. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1994)); GAlT 1994, supra note
3, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XVI, § 4.
191. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
192. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
193. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Reeves v Stake,
447 U.S. 429 (1980).
194. South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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2. The Federalism Debate
As we can see, the abdication of legislative authority has implications
for both federal and state laws.' 95 Federalism concerns, therefore, perme-
ate much of the United States' trade discussions. The CUSFTA Imple-
mentation Act even contained a provision which stated that CUSFTA
provisions "prevail over ... any conflicting State law ... and any
conflicting application of any State law to any person or circum-
stance."' 96 Although the NAFTA Implementation Act has no comparable
provision, the NAFTA itself requires the parties to insure that its obliga-
tions are observed at the state and provincial level, with provisions for
certain exceptions. 197 GATT 1994 also requires every member to make
sure that the WTO Agreement is complied with at all levels of govern-
ment, and some of the individual agreements refer explicitly to state
measures.19
8
Before NAFTA and GATT 1994, the Supreme Court had held that in
matters of international trade, the United States "speaks with one
voice, ' 99 and the exclusive congressional power over foreign commerce
may be so broad as to invalidate state laws which impact foreign com-
merce even in the absence of conflicting federal legislation. 2W In United
States v. Belmont, Justice Sutherland opined:
In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in
respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As
to such purposes the state of New York does not exist. Within the
field of its powers, whatever the United States rightfully under-
takes, it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when judi-
cial authority is invoked in aid of such consummation, state
195. See, e.g., David Rapp, Will GATT Gut State Laws? GOVERNING MAG., Sept. 1994;
Ruth Wallick, GATT and preemption of state and local laws, GOV'T FIN. REV., Oct. 1994, at
46; Michael Shuman, With GATT, We Must Guard Our Cities, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1994, at
sec. 3, p. 13.
196. CUSFrA Implementation Act, supra note 3, at sec. 102, Relationship of the Agree-
ment to United States Law.
197. NAFrA, supra note 3, at art. 105.
198. And on the heels of this agreement, the European Union has already compiled a list
of U.S. state and local regulations they would like to challenge, including California's unitary
tax law, state laws that discriminate against foreign-owned banks and insurance companies, and
city and state safety certification requirements for products such as electrical shavers and
industrial fasteners. Rapp, supra note 195.
199. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
200. Id. at 449; Kenneth J. Cooper, Note, To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance
with International Trade Agreements at the State Level, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 143, 145
(1993).
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constitutions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to the
inquiry and decision.2"'
State courts have agreed.20 2 Although no federal case provides direct
authority on the status of the GATT in domestic litigation," a relatively
consistent line of state judicial and attorney-general opinions has consid-




As soon as the federalism issue arose during recent trade negotia-
tions, however, the debate over federal preemption resumed with
201. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331-32. This typically hyperbolic statement
from Justice Sutherland prompted Justice Douglas to offer a softer (though at heart, identical)
picture of federal powers over states in international matters, stating:
It is of course true that even treaties with foreign nations will be carefully construed
so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the States of this nation
unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy .... But state law must
yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or provisions of a treaty or
of an international compact or agreement.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942).
202. See, e.g., Territory of Hawaii v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565, 565 (1957) (invalidating a
territorial law which required all sellers of foreign eggs to post a sign reading "We Sell
Foreign Eggs" as conflicting with GAT'rs national treatment obligations); Baldwin-Lima-
Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that
a contract proposal requiring all electric generating equipment purchased by the city of San
Francisco be manufactured in the United States was contrary to GATT 1947, and therefore
invalid under the Supremacy Clause).
203. However, GATT 1947 has been used in the interpretation of domestic legislation. In
United States v. Star Industries, the plaintiffs asserted that section 252(c) of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, which authorized the President to amend the tariff schedules in
response to unfair trade practices by other countries, required that such retaliatory action be
targeted solely at the offending party. 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1076 (1972); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 252, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (1988). The court assumed that GATT had legal status, and therefore found that
Article I's MFN obligations required that the retaliatory measures taken under Article XXVIII
must be effective against all nations rather than a specific target. Id. at 563. Less deferential,
the Eastern District of New York noted that GATT did not create treaty law because Congress
had not ratified it. Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771, 795 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
citing United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 575 n22 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
204. Brand, supra note 172, at 486. See also, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board Commrs.,
276 Cal. App. 2d 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (where the California Court of Appeals found a
Californian "Buy American" statute unconstitutional because the general subject of government
procurement was precluded by extensive federal regulation and U.S. international agreement
on the matter). The court noted: "State regulation [in this area] can only impede, not foster,
national trade policies. The problems of trade expansion or nonexpansion are national in scope,
and properly should be national in scope in their resolution." Id. at 226. The court continued,
in regards to the California Buy American Act, "Such state legislation may bear a particular
onus to foreign nations since it may appear to be the product of selfish provincialism, rather
than an instrument of justifiable policy. It is a type of protectionism which invites retaliative
restrictions on our own trade." Id. at 228. See also, K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey
Dist. Water Supply Comm'n., 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed 435 U.S.
982 (1978) (noting, in response to a challenge of New Jersey's "Buy American" Act, that
GATT was "by virtue of the federal constitution, the 'supreme law of the land,' and that "[a]
state law must yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or provisions of a
treaty").
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renewed vigor, fueled by concerns inside the Beltway regarding overex-
tension of federal power.2 5 Not lost was the fact that the inclusion of
services and investment in the NAFTA and Uruguay Round agreements
means that areas such as banking, investment services, tourism, and
insurance are increasingly being pulled away from the traditional zone of
state regulation.
The strains of this debate led to relatively weak results in govern-
ment procurements and services - two areas of extreme importance to
trade 2 06 but also of particular sensitivity for U.S. states.2' 7 Even though
the "buy national" practices of U.S. state governments have been recog-
nized as significant obstacles to trade, they remain major loopholes in
the GATT system. °8 The Third Circuit recently addressed this issue
205. The marked trend in the U.S. Congress towards granting increased state powers and
discretion develops in tension with the growing federalization of trade matters. It should be
extremely interesting to see how this tension plays out, especially if that trend continues and
the Uruguay Round Agreement begins to be implemented in practice.
206. The Tokyo Round of GATT had concluded a minor agreement on government
procurement, but only certain contracts valued at above a relatively large amount were
covered, with service and construction contracts explicitly omitted from the agreement, and
only those governmental entities specifically designated by each signatory nations were subject
to the 1979 Code's provisions. Agreement on Government Procurement, art. I, Apr. 11, 1979,
GAI'T B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 33 (1980). Regarding the government procurement practices
of national governments, the Uruguay Round seems to have concluded a relatively strong
agreement even though not many countries have signed on to the code.
207. In the United States, annual state and local government purchases total approximately
$200 billion. Cooper, supra note 200, at 159, citing US Department of Commerce figures. See
also, generally, James D. Southwick, Binding the States: A Survey of State Law Conformance
with the Standards of the GATT Procurement Code, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 57 (1992);
Robert Frazer Miller, Note, Buy-American Statutes -An Assessment of Validity Under Present
Law and a Recommendation for Preemption, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 137 (1991); Note, State Buy
American Laws - Invalidity of State Attempts to Favor American Purchasers, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 389 (1980); James C. Olson, Note, Federal Limitations on State "Buy-American" Laws,
21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 177 (1982).
State concerns had also affected the NAFTA negotiations, and although NAFTA does
attempt to set most-favored nation (MFN) obligations for U.S. states, it imposes no hard
obligations regarding government procurement by state entities. The relevant provision
provides that the parties commit to ". . . endeavor to consult with their state and provincial
governments with a view to obtaining commitments, on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, to
include within the obligations of this Chapter procurement by state and provincial government
entities and enterprises." NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1024(3). However, negotiations regarding
the extension of the government procurement chapter to states and provincial governments are
to be conducted no later than December 31, 1998. Id. annex 1001.la-3; art. 1024.
208. As of 1992, 37 states had "Buy In-State Provisions," and 16 states (including 14 of
the "Buy In-State" states) maintained provisions that either required or encouraged the
procurement of American made goods and services. Cooper, supra note 200, at 162, citing
Southwick, supra note 207, at 75-78. There is also a federal national procurement statute, the
Buy American Act of 1933, 41 U.S.C.A. §§ i0a-10d. It requires federal agencies to buy
domestically produced goods unless the price is unreasonable or the purchase is not in the
public interest. Under the Federal Acquisition Regulations, domestic suppliers are generally
granted the contract if their offer price is not more than 6% over that offered by foreign
suppliers. 48 C.F.R. § 25.105 (1993). That figure is 12% if the domestic offer is from a small
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when a Canadian manufacturer challenged the validity of the Pennsylva-
nia Steel Products Procurement Act, which required that suppliers use
only American-made steel in products sold to public agencies. 209 The
court found that the 1979 GATT Agreement on Government Procure-
ment and the CUSFTA were inapplicable to the issue at hand because
the language only required parties to encourage state compliance, and
the legislative history of the implementing acts indicated that Congress
and the Executive Branch understood that state governments would not
be covered.210
These gaps in trade agreement coverage have arisen because certain
areas of commerce have traditionally been within the zone of state
regulation.21 Nowhere is the tradition of state regulation more reflected
than in the services sector. Some have begun to question the continuing
merit of that tradition, with economists agreeing that trade in services
will become the most vibrant cross-border transaction in the future (if
not already so).212 Add to this the fact that the competitiveness of the
U.S. service sectors far outweighs that of its trading partners, and it is
not surprising that the United States has been the strongest supporter of
a services agreement.1 On the other hand, constitutional considerations
of state sovereignty have, in part, precluded the United States from
negotiating rules for trade in services as concrete as those for trade in
goods. While the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
purports to extend unconditional MFN to trade in services, the working
business concern or a labor surplus concern. In the case of acquisitions by the Defense
Department, the preference buffer is 50%. 48 C.F.R. § 225.105 (1993). Even with these
preferences, President Bush identified the EU as discriminating against U.S. goods in govern-
ment procurement in certain sectors because of a 3% Buy European preference. 57 Fed. Reg.
15,217 (1992).
209. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
210. Id. The court also held that the statute was not invalidated by the Commerce Clause
because the state was acting as a "market participant" rather than a "market regulator," and
under this concept, nothing forbids it from restricting its own sales or purchases. The Com-
merce Clause only restricted the state's attempts to "regulate."
211. See, e.g., Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S.
493, 518 (1989); South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Wilson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
212. In a 1991 report, it was purported that trade in services comprised 25% of all world
trade, $90 billion in U.S. exports, and 90% of the growth in U.S. employment since 1980.
JACKSON, supra note 31, at 893, citing Report to the Congress on the Extension of Fast Track
Procedures, March 1, 1991, at 51. The USTR's office in 1992 claimed that U.S. services
exports equaled $164 billion. Id. at 893.
213. See generally Jeffrey Clay Clark, The United States Proposal for. a General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services and Its Preemption of Inconsistent State Law, 15 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 75 (Winter 1992).
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provisions read more like an oratory wishlist than a binding set of
regulations." 4
As mentioned above, tradition is often the sole rationale for continu-
ing state regulatory dominance in certain areas. The Supreme Court,
however, has held that this "traditional functions" test (which basically
states that those areas the states have traditionally regulated should
remain within state authority) no longer controls the issue, and has
endorsed an extremely broad view of federal power.2"5 Accordingly, a
government procurement agreement which purports to bind states may
not be constitutionally difficult - only politically so. In fact, U.S. nego-
tiators believed that the federal government had the authority to make an
agreement regulating even state government procurement, and it was
objections from other nations that eventually defeated the negotiations.
21 6
The harmonization movement also raises federalism concerns be-
cause state measures are subject to challenge in the dispute resolution
process.2 7 If a measure is found to be inconsistent with GATT 1994, the
state must either comply and change the measure, or the USTR must
214. See General Agreement on Trade In Services, April 15, 1994, art. II.
215. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The
"traditional functions" test as delivered in National League of Cities v. Usery lasted less than
a decade. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In upholding the application of the Railway Labor Act to a
dispute between the state-owned Long Island Railroad and its unions, Chief Justice Burger
noted that the traditional functions test ". . . was not meant to give history a hammerlock on
protected state activity but merely stated a requirement that a reviewing court inquire into
whether federal regulation would hamper the state government's ability to fulfill its role in the
Union and endanger its separate and independent existence." United Transportation Union v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 687 (1982). Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority followed soon after, with the Court holding: "Our examination of this [traditional]
'function' standard ... now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state
regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not only unworkable but
is inconsistent with established principles of federalism .... 469 U.S. at 531.
216. JACKSON, ET. AL, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 144 (1984); Matthew Schaefer, Note on State
Involvement in Trade Negotiations, The Development of Trade Agreement Implementing
Legislation, and the Administration of Trade Agreements (January 18, 1994), in JACKSON,
supra note 31, at 181. The U.S. approach still hinges on binding states to government procure-
ment obligations on a voluntary basis; as of December 15, 1993 (the close of the Uruguay
Round), 24 states had agreed to bind some or all of their procurement.
217. DSU, supra note 58, art. 29:9. Notes Barry Friedman, "This process of harmoniza-
tion will have an important impact on American federalism. In part, non-uniformity is inherent
in the idea of American federalism - the notion that fifty different states and numerous local
governments can go their own way in developing regulatory frameworks." Barry Friedman,
Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (1994). A major
focus of the TBT Agreement was subfederal, compliance, resulting in a series of rather strict
provisions on the matter. Article 3:5 expressly states that the Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) Agreement must be observed by states. And where states attempt to deviate from
international (and federal) standards, they must publish the measures and notify the Members
of such. GATT, supra note 3, TBT Agreement, art. III, para. 2,5.
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bring action against the state in a federal court.218 Seeking to avoid a
drawn-out political battle with state interest advocates, the Clinton Ad-
ministration agreed to include in the implementing legislation a number
of concessions designed to appease those concerned by possible preemp-
tion of state laws. As implemented in U.S. law, an adverse finding by a
WTO dispute settlement panel does not automatically nullify the state
law or regulation. This can happen only at the initiative of the state, or
in an action brought against the state by the executive branch. 219 Fur-
thermore, to clarify the fact that GATT 1994 does not have direct effect
in the United States, the implementing legislation points out that only the
United States may bring an action against a state or political subdivision
concerning any allegations of noncompliance. 220 Thus, both the state and
the federal government can choose to ignore a WTO panel report, and
simply suffer the sanctions or pay compensation.
3. Redrawing the Bounds of Sovereignty
Critics of the present internationalization movement within the
United States have seized upon loss of sovereignty, both at the federal
and state level, to argue against further progress in that direction. Much
of the Constitution's "bias" against an international ROL order may stem
from related concerns. Such an order requires putting a small measure of
U.S. sovereignty on the back burner. For some, this is a hard fact to
accept after so many years of U.S. dominance in power-oriented interna-
tional relations.
Is the relinquishment of any amount of U.S. legislative or judicial
authority a circumvention of democracy? There are those who believe
that the international arena, with its "democracy deficit," is not the place
to be determining (or permitting) measures that should be determined via
a democratic process within the United States.22' Some even argue that
the process of negotiating international agreements itself is less subject
to public scrutiny, than domestic lawmaking, and therefore, it threatens
democratic accountability.222
218. Uruguay Round Implementation Act, supra note 3, § 102(b).
219. Id. § 102(b)(2).
220. Id. § 102(c)(2).
221. See Robert F. Housman, Symposium: Democratizing International Trade Decision
Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 702 (1994); see also Patti Goldman, The Democratiza-
tion of the Development of United States Trade Police, 27 CORNELL IN'TL L.J. 631, 633
(1994).
222. See Robert E. Hudec, "Circumventing" Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade
Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311 (1993).
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Professor Robert Hudec, however, argues that the process by which
we have agreed to international guidelines is every bit as "democratic"
as domestic legislation.223 He writes:
It is possible for any political body, even an electorate, to recognize
that it does not have the institutional capacity to act wisely in
certain types of decisions. A decision to participate less, based on
such a perception, is surely as legitimate, and as democratic, as was
the hands-on, free-for-all scramble for tariff protection in Smoot-
Hawley.224
One can carry Professor Hudec's assertion further: the democratic pro-
cess can thrust the United States into the international trading communi-
ty, or it can withdraw the United States from such a community.225 It is
another thing, however, to allow the United States to be involved in the
trade arena, and yet not allow it to play by the international rules.
Furthermore, a closer look at the trade system in place today suggests
that the United States may have given up very little actual sovereignty.
Under U.S. law, the provisions of GATT 1994 and NAFTA have no
effect if they conflict with domestic law.226 This language was repeated
by the Federal Circuit, which held in a seminal case, "[t]he GATT does
not trump domestic legislation; if the statutory provisions at issue here
are inconsistent with the GATT, it is a matter for Congress to decide and
remedy."227
Finally, the current outcry against the United States' "relinquish-
ment" of sovereignty turns the United States' own asserted notions of
sovereignty on its head. For years, the United States has called for the
abdication of vast amounts of sovereignty by other nations, especially in
223. Id.
224. lId Although that comment was directed at the fast track process, the heart of the
argument also speaks to the criticism against relinquishment of legislative authority in any
matter.
225. According to one established notion of national sovereignty, a nation's agreement to
restrict its liberty of action does not affect sovereignty, as long as it has the power to opt out
of that agreement. Fried, supra note 44, at 40-41.
226. See Uruguay Round Implementation Act, supra note 3, at § 102(a).
227. Suramerica de Aleciones Laminada, CA. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). The case involved countervailing and antidumping duties and the Commerce
Department's interpretation of the words "on behalf of" in the antidumping legislation.
Although a GATT panel had rejected the Commerce Department's interpretation, the Federal
Circuit upheld that interpretation because of primacy of U.S. implementing legislation in the
face of conflicting international obligations. Id., at 667-68. But see, RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 164, § 114 (stating that where possible, a U.S. statute should be construed to avoid
conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States); see
also, Mississippi Poultry Assn., Inc. v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc
review pending); Footwear Distributors & Retailers of America v. United States. 852 F. Supp.
1078 (CIT 1994).
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the field of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement, asserting that the effects
on the United States gave it a right to demand such relinquishment.228
Now the argument is thrust back at the United States - the effects of
domestic policies on international trade require the trading nations to
relinquish a measure of their sovereignty.
F. An Overarching Control Authority With Sanctioning Power
- "There cannot be good laws where there are not good arms."
- Niccolb Machiavelli
229
Within any ROL system, there needs to be an overarching control
authority that oversees the system and makes sure that infractions are
punished. 20 This overarching control authority keeps members of the
community in line with the laws. The international trade community is
currently progressing toward this end. And as with dispute resolution and
its level of binding effect, the severity of "tangible" economic sanctions
serves as an excellent indicator of how committed to the system of laws
the parties are.
Enforcement issues are of particular interest to the United States.
Cases coming under the WTO dispute resolution system will usually
involve national (or state) policies, not private actions. Consequently,
prompt compliance with the results of this process may be extremely
difficult for the United States. When only an administrative regulation is
involved, the United States may be able to respond and correct it rela-
tively quickly. However, when a statute is called into question, the
legislative process may take some time.23' In the past, the United States
has sidestepped this problem by blocking or delaying the adoption of
reports, but since this avenue has now been cut off by the new DSU, the
United States will now need to find a way to comply.
232
228. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom
Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) and its brethren; Laker Airways Limited. v. Sabena
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and this series of cases.
229. NiccoLt MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 71 (Leo Paul S. de Alvarez trans., rev. ed. 1981).
230. Notes one observer, "The story of GATT's institutional development is one of
attempting, against all odds, to install incentives for compliance." Victoria C. Price, New
Institutional Developments In GAiT, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 87, 90 (1992).
231. Palmeter & Spak, supra note 33, at 1164. For example, in June 1987, an adverse
panel report was adopted in the "Superfund case," but the United States did not comply by
amending the legislation until more than two years later. Id. at n.71, citing Steel Trade
Liberalization Program Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-221, 103 Stat 1886 (codified in
26 U.S.C. 4611).
232. Id at n.72, citing Director-General Reports on Dispute-Settlement Panels, 95 GATT
Focus NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 4-5.
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These issues were not addressed under the old GATT system because
it avoided purposeful economic sanctions and relied instead on the force
of organized normative pressure.233 In fact, there was no formal process
for monitoring compliance with panel reports. Where the dispute arose
between nations of comparable economic strength, trade wars loomed
precisely because of the lack of an enforcement mechanism. For exam-
ple, even though a GATT panel found in favor of the United States'
complaint regarding EC oilseeds subsidies, the GATT was powerless to
compel compliance by the EC. The result was a standoff in which the
United States threatened to impose duties of up to 200% on EC goods
imported into the United States.2
The WTO takes the opposite course by making the imposition of
sanctions more automatic.235 Under Article 22 of the DSU, the violating
party has a "reasonable period of time" in which to implement the
results of the report. During that period, the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) is directed to keep a sharp eye on the progress of compliance.236
After that time, the offending party can opt to compensate the prevailing
party, but this is totally voluntary. If the negotiations fail to settle upon
a suitable level of compensation, then the prevailing party may choose
to apply for a suspension of concessions.237 Upon such application, the
DSB must quickly grant suspension authorization unless the DSB decides
by consensus to reject the request. If the violating party objects to the
level of retaliation, it can bring the matter to arbitration.238
Because intellectual property rights have been included in the Uru-
guay Round agreements (through the TRIPS Agreement), a possible
retaliatory measure could include the seizure of TRIPS rights. Weaker
trading partners, especially, can argue that retaliation in the same or even
unrelated sectors will hurt them more than the offending country against
233. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 201
(1990).
234. See James R. Arnold, The Oilseeds Dispute and the Validity of Unilateralism In a
Multilateral Context, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 187 (1994).
235. The United States had begun to experiment with automatic enforcement mechanisms
in CUSFTA. Under Article 1806(3), if a Party failed to implement in a timely fashion the
findings of a binding arbitration panel, then compensation would have to be paid. If the
offending Party refused to pay the compensation, then the other Party had the right to suspend
the application of equivalent benefits. CUSFTA, supra note 3, art.1806(3). NAFTA carried
over these mechanisms. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 2019.
236. DSU, supra note 58, art. 22(2).
237. The suspension of concessions should preferably be in the same sector as that in
which the violation occurred. If that isn't practicable or effective, the party may seek to
suspend concessions in other sectors under the same agreement. Finally, should that too prove
impractical, concessions may be suspended from another agreement. Id. art. 22(3).
238. Id at art. 22(6).
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whom the sanction is directed. Thus, the seizure of TRIPS rights may be
upheld in the ensuing arbitration over the proper level of retaliation. On
the other hand, arbitrators may be loathe to grant seizure of TRIPS rights
on policy grounds, especially because it would provide a bad precedent
of the WTO sanctioning violations of other international agreements,
such as the Paris and Berne Conventions. However, given the importance
of TRIPS rights, even the more powerful members may be loathe to risk
being subject to this retaliatory measure.
Regardless of how the above scenario plays out, the WTO's new
sanctioning system does have a number of effects on the international
trade order. Parties must take the laws and obligations set forth much
more seriously. Consequently, the "agree now and breach later" tactic in
negotiations is no longer a viable option. With the WTO standing as the
new control authority, the legal system becomes much more "real" -
both psychologically and practically. Consequently, the moral suasion
which is so hard to achieve in unilateral or even group sanctions now
automatically accompanies every panel decision.
Even before the automatic sanctioning system of the WTO, William
Davey had posited four reasons why such a system would be benefi-
cial.239 First, the novelty of retaliation would decrease with use and
would eventually be seen as a normal part of the international dispute
resolution system. Second, the threat of internationally approved retalia-
tion would encourage speedy resolution of a dispute. Third, on a norma-
tive level, retaliation would reestablish the balance of concessions among
the disputing parties that had been skewed through a party's violation of
the rules. Finally, because retaliation would occur anyway, it would be
desirable for GATT (now the WTO) to exercise supervision over the
matter and prevent a trade war from erupting.
Another route through which the WTO system may be able to breed
an environment of compliance and enforcement is through the new Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). This is a system whereby the WTO
reviews the trade policies and laws of every party on a periodic basis,
and issues a comprehensive report. Currently, these reports are only
descriptive, with little legal analysis. However, the parties do seem to be
taking the outcome of these reports seriously,m which suggests a possi-
ble use of the reports to embarrass parties into compliance. Furthermore,
239. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 101-02
(1987).
240. For example, the EC absolutely bristled at the TPRM criticism of the EC's use of
VERs, and sought to defend itself publicly on a number of occasions.
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the most tantalizing prospect of the TPRM is the possibility of its serving
as a basis for an "attorney general-like" position within the WTO, with
the authority of bringing cases in serious offender situations." t
CONCLUSION
Despite its lingering reputation as a playground bully, the United
States can be observed to be slowly developing a respect for the Rule of
Law, as are the United States' trading partners. The mentality of the U.S.
Congress has certainly progressed beyond the cynical attitude once held
by many of its members that GATT rules are irrelevant. Congressional
committees, in a number of illustrative instances, have gone to great
lengths to ensure that their legislative proposals comply with GATT
provisions.242 In other instances, Congress has been persuaded to drop
certain proposals because of their inconsistencies with GATT.243 The
Executive Branch is also influenced in its actions by arguments of
GATT conformity. Even during the recent U.S.-Japan automobile parts
dispute of 1995, U.S. trade officials always stressed their constant, yet
dubious, contention that the United States' approach was GATT-legal.24
As we have seen, however, the emergence of the ROL in U.S. trade
policies has not come easily, or without cost. Serious constitutional issues
have been left unresolved in the rush toward internationalization. As the
effects of such internationalization begin to be felt on the domestic scene,
those questions left undecided may return in more virulent form. Ignoring
the movement towards internationalization would spell economic disaster,
however, not only for the United States but for the world trading commu-
nity as well. Congress attempted to do just that in the early 1930s, during
the early stages of world economic internationalization, and the result
241. Kenneth Abbott, in fact, has proposed that such self-initiated cases could be brought
where a "general community interest was at stake and private proceedings could not be relied
upon to protect it." Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building
a Private-Interests System of Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111, 117 (1992). This idea
of a WTO attorney-general may also have been in the Mavroidis' mind when he proclaimed
that "[t]he TPRM, not so much in its present form ... but in its future evolved form, will
likely make a great contribution to the multilateral system." Petros C. Mavroidis, Surveillance
Schemes: The GATT's New Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 374,
(nn. 10- 11) (1992).
242. JACKSON, supra note 62, at 83.
243. I. at 83, n.4 (citing the example of the change in the U.S. law on the "Domestic
International Sales Corporation").
244. Id. See, e.g., Ben Wildavsky, The Big Deal, 25 THE NATIONAL JOURNAL 1650 (June
24, 1995); see also, Anthony Rowley, Garten Sees US-Japan Trade Spats Continuing After
2000, Bus. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1995, at 8 (noting Garten's contention that the WTO is not ready
for disputes of this kind).
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was a worldwide depression on an unprecedented scale. Clearly, the
answer is not to shut the United States out of the process of international-
ization for fear that the Constitution might be implicated.
U.S. and global trade systems clearly seem to be beating a path
towards the Rule of Law. This fact must be recognized in order to avoid
reaching conclusions that are out of synch with both international reality
and constitutional doctrines. When constitutional scholars acknowledge
the movement toward the Rule of Law, and internationalists admit the
ultimate primacy of the Constitution, even in the face of pragmatic
demands, we will be better prepared to discern which aspects of the
international trade order truly implicate the Constitution and which are
but phantom issues.
As Professor Jackson once noted, "The compartmentalization of legal
processes into international on one hand and national on the other can
lead to serious misunderstandings of the world today." 245 Cases of
constitutional interpretation with international implications are ripe for
such misunderstandings. They frequently require balancing tests that
weigh practical considerations, "public interest," and textual mandates.2'
For almost a century, U.S. economic hegemony has been an uncited
practical consideration that lay behind the development of key U.S.
Supreme Court doctrines. Remove this hegemony from the analytic mix,
and some interpretations may have to change. Many of the recent debates
concerning the role of the United States in the world trading system
reflect growing pains associated with the maturation of constitutional doc-
trine in the face of U.S. internationalization.
245. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTI-
TUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 2 (1984).
246. For an interesting exploration of this aspect of constitutional interpretation, see T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
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